# Notes

Idea for the AC:

Purpose is that it is supposed to start off with a description of the ghost dance (after ghost dance song), meaning of ghost dance then evidence about how the land is haunted itself. Next, talk about lakota’s heavy connection to the land (landrum) bc it talks about boarding schools and stuff (in tag: massacre at wounded knee end was part of one of the many attempts at assimilation by the US but the ghosts that haunt the territories of the land itself take a meaningful priority over the haunting of the people). In here say that their spirits are haunted and they are haunting the land. With the connection to the land – impact more with spirituality and impact it more (to them the land is a source of power the US colonization removes that power entirely and is a way to capture and excorsize the spirit of native americans). After talk about general colonizing strategies (first phase of colonization was to push off the land and put into reservation). then talk about what the haunting means (of the land itself) and then transition into the act of colonization has entered into a new form of colonization where NA land is bought, sorted and repurposed for waste. New age of colonization which is now the 2nd phase in which the US buys the land it segregated and uses it for dumping on native American remains. Then talk about desecration of indian burial grounds. Then talk about how they appropriate objects & how the US used native Americans and their land and culture as a way to boost nationalism and assimilate it as a tool to use for the state’s vision. Then have impacts of like nuclear colonialism – renders the land totally unusable, poisons their life supplies but also strips them of the last bit of sovereignty – makes native american’s totally reducible. Then the looming spectre of colonialism watches this (gage weaves these tags) land isn’t just poisoning their life, land literally is a part of them. Destruction of the land is a destruction of what it means to exist in native American society. Land is the lynchpin of subjective native American existence.

Goal of the 1AC is to repurpose history and conjure up these feelings

Concept of temporality – Lakota people feel like they just had the massacre of wounded knee – they are in a constant state of mourning. Richardson – use of ghost stories in haunted areas and burial grounds

Focus on land and segregation and assimilation of the land is a key impact to the aff

Feeling of power & vitality rests in the land so nuclear colonialism not only reduces that land to nothing but also makes it unusable for vitality and power.

A2: still presence when they aren’t there

there Is no one to remember it

if the colonizer is always playing the game they will keep excorsizing ghosts endlessely and makes it unresolveable

# Dancing with Ghosts

#### This is the Ghost Dance

Elliot ’98 (Elliott, Michael A. "Ethnography, Reform, and the Problem of the Real: James Mooney's Ghost-Dance Religion." *American Quarterly* 50.2 (1998): 201-33. Web. Pg.1 ODA 9/1/16 //KAE+GK)

**The whole world is coming,**

**A nation is coming, a nation is coming.**

**The Eagle has brought a message to the tribe.**

**The father says so, the father says so.**

**Over the whole earth they are coming,**

**The buffalo are coming, the buffalo are coming.**

#### Gehres 01 explains

(Edward D. Gehres III\*, “Visions of the Ghost Dance: Native American Empowerment and the Neo-Colonial Impulse,” Hein Online, 2001, Online, Accessed 8/20/16, Pages 135-137. \*Associate, Arnold and Porter, Washington, D.C.; J.D., 2001, University of Virginia School of Law; MA., 1996, The Graduate School of Political Management at The George Washington University; A.B., 1994, University of Michigan. //KAE+GK)

In the midst of a time of great suffering following their confinement to reservations, Indian2 nations in the central plains region focused their fears of the past and their hopes for the future on a new religious movement known as the ghost dance.3 The leaders of this movement believed that great change and rebirth were on the horizon for Indian nations and that the spirits of the dead who had lost their lives in the battles with the white man would come back to life, that the abundance of the buffalo would return, and that the white man would vanish from their land.4 It was a ritual embodying a hope for peace and prosperity that revived spirituality and hope among Indian nations.5 The ghost dance was brought to the people by a Paiute holy man named Wovoka, and it came to the government's attention when the great warrior Sitting Bull left his retirement home at Standing Rock Agency and joined the Oglala Sioux ghost dancers. 6 The ritual emboldened the people of these Indian nations to show cultural pride, and the government, fearing insurrection, cracked down on the practice of the ghost dance religion. Misconstruing it as a dangerous uprising instead of as a rebirth of national confidence and self-awareness among Indian people, the federal government dispatched a reconstituted Seventh Cavalry - the same unit that suffered defeat at Custer's last stand - to quell the practice of the ghost dance. 7 Disaster ensued as the Seventh Cavalry killed Sitting Bull for supposedly resisting arrest, and then continued on to murder 350 Indian refugees at Wounded Knee Creek.8 The tragedy of the ghost dance and the resulting massacre at Wounded Knee should serve as an allegorical warning for today's relations between Indian nations and the United States government. In the thirty some years since Richard Nixon articulated the federal policy of Self-Determination for Indian tribes, 9 many tribal governments have been plagued by malfeasance or insufficient resources, but there have also been some striking successes.10 In some cases, Indian tribes have "re-invented" themselves as modern day sovereign governments reflecting both the efficiency and functionality of successful state governments and the vital traditions of their past. These tribes have leveraged the few economic development footholds available to them into successful economic development ventures aimed at establishing a lasting tribal infrastructure and creating a sustainable prosperity for the future.11 This potent combination of enterprise development and tribal sovereignty intertwined with the cultural history and traditions of the past is the "new ghost dance" for Indian nations.

#### **Landrum 11 continues**

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In the 1992 film Thunderheart, a young man of Sioux ancestry, Ray Levoi, returns to his homeland as an FBI agent to help solve a string of murders of Indian activists. He learns that his ancestor Thunderheart was among those murdered by U.S. soldiers during the 1890 massacre at Wounded Knee. After a while Ray begins to have fitful dreams and visions of the event. In the dream he is “running with the Old Ones” and is shot in the back. The film implies that his biological ties to the community are enough to trigger a series of metaphysical events. His ancestors return to haunt him and to help provide knowledge that will aid him in his quest for truth. Thunderheart is not the first film in which Hollywood has attempted to tell the story of one of the worst incidents of genocide in the history of the U.S.-Indigenous relations, the Wounded Knee Massacre. However, the filmmaker takes a different approach as he blends history and familiar uncanny motifs in an effort to move the story toward its inevitable conclusion. For instance, it is implied that Jimmy Looks Twice, a fictional activist played bY the real-life American Indian Movement (AIM) member John Trudell, has the power to shape-shift into a deer. An elderly medicine man, Grandpa Reaches, has mystical connections to the ancestral past—he simply “knows” things. When Ray Levoi wistfully wishes that Maggie (a character reminiscent of the real-life Anna Mae Aquash), a female activist murdered during the course of the film, could be there in person to see the triumph of good over evil, Walter Crow Horse (played by Graham Greene) gently remind him: “She was, Ray, she was.” The film blends fact and fiction in a way that underscores that, **for modern-day Lakota people,** **Wounded Knee is a haunted location**. On December 29, 1890, the Minneconjou Sioux Chief Big Foot and his “bedraggles band of staving Ghost Dancers” were camped along the Wounded Knee Creek, where they were slain by members of the U.S. Cavalry on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in South Dakota.17 Big Foot and his band were pursued by the U.S. Cavalry soldiers, who feared a localized outbreak of the Ghost Dance religion.18 In the aftermath of the massacre, the ethnologist James Mooney acquired objects and personal belongings, including the Ghost Dance shirts worn by the deceased, and shipped them east to the Smithsonian Institution. Under the auspices of the Bureau of Ethnology, Mooney was commissioned to acquire and curate an ethnographic collection for the World’s Columbian Exposition and to continue his work among the Cherokee of Oklahoma, which initially involved several trips west between 1891 and 1894.19 In the aftermath of the Wounded Knee Massacre,20 the Northern Plains people were both militarily and **spiritually disarmed**. And **as their lands were occupied, they were corralled onto reservations** and their secular and religious objects were placed in storage units in large metropolitan museums. According to the AIM activist, modern Ghost Dancer, and adopted Lakota Sioux tribal member Robert Van Pelt (Siletz/Umatilla), **the people parted** with their objects **only when forced to by economic hardship** **and constant duress form outside forces**.21 In a sense, the Ghost dance religion 22 succeeded, because the dead did return, but not in the fashion in which the followers of the religion had anticipated.23 According to Sioux tribal members today, **the Wounded Knee site is haunted by those who were gunned down in the snow on December** 29, 1890. The activist Mary Crow Dog, in her memoir, references the spirits of the site as she describes the birth of her first child during AIM’s occupancy at Wounded Knee: Monday, just as the morning star came out, my water broke and I went down to the sweat lodge to pray. I wanted to go into the sweat but the Black Elk would not let me. Maybe there was a taboo against my participating, just as a menstruating woman is not allowed to take part in a ceremony. I was disappointed. I did not feel that the fact that my water burst had made me ritually unclean. As i walked away from the vapor hut, for the third time, I heard the ghostly cry and lamenting of a woman and child coming out of the massacre ravine. Others had heard it too. I felt that the spirits were all around me. I was later told that some of the marshals inside their sandbagged positions had also heard it, and some could not stand it and had themselves transferred.

#### The Lakota Dancers teach us that these looming ghosts, like the ones at Wounded Knee, are the power of Native populations and embedded in the land itself. As the United States attempted to exterminate Native populations, the landscape became painted with the spiritual hauntings of historical colonial domination

Landrum 11 \*Cynthia Landrum Shape-shifters, Ghosts, and Residual Power teaches in the Native American Studies Program at Portland State University. She received her PhD in history from Oklahoma State University. Phantom Past, Indigenous Presence: Native Ghosts in North American Culture & History, Ed. Colleen E. Boyd & Coll Thrush, 2011, Nebraska Press, 256-258 \*editorial chapters done by multiple authors, Landrum is one section //KAE+GK)

Stories of ghosts and hauntings are present in every society.1 The traditional conviction among most American Indian people is that ghosts can be malignant forces or act as guardian spirits. In particular, the Lakota believe that spirits or ghosts seen in daylight or at dusk can be dangerous and benevolent, depending on the context in which they are encountered. It is believed that benevolent ghosts can provide protection or guidance, or even become part of the landscape where a traumatic or powerful event occurred. Malevolent spirits, however, can cause spiritual, physical and/or emotional harm to the living.2 Stories of the uncanny or supernatural are actively reinforced by the oral historical narratives that emanate directly from tribal communities despite generations of assimilation, territorial conquest, spiritual colonialism, and academic and religious bigotry toward Northern Plains beliefs. Likewise, for many Lakota people, material objects that have been collected by museums still resonate with “power” despite the fact that they have been removed from their original context. As a result, such objects—and the new places they inhabit—may also become haunted. In this essay I will examine and compare Northern Plains beliefs about haunted locations, spirits, and objects in three contexts: the ghosts of victims massacred in 1890 at the Wounded Knee site in South Dakota; stories about the Deer People, shape-shifters that are half-deer and half-human; and hauntings that allegedly occurred around material objects displayed in the Great plains exhibition hall and storage areas at the National Museum of Natural History. Further, I will show that indigenous belief systems have survived despite cultural genocide, will demonstrate the hybridity of everyday beliefs as American Indians contribute to American popular culture, will show that Native beliefs are not hermetically sealed but rather engage the stories of colonial society as well, and, finally, discuss how these everyday/everywhere ghost stories are grounded in actual histories of colonialism**. Traditional sacred sites, stories, and/or museum objects as vessels for “power”—both temporary and permanent—that connect the everyday world with the supernatural.** The Northern Plains stores recorded here were told to me by individual consultants from various tribes, and museum employees and professionals who chose to remain anonymous. Some of the interviews are from as early as the fall of 1991, while others took place in the fall of 2008. However, I have worked with tribal members in the northern Plains since 1991. My work as a historian has caused primarily on American Indian government-sponsored boarding schools and the effect of the educational system upon the Northern Plains tribes. In addition to performing scholarly research, I have worked as a museum professional and have specifically dealt with the care of Native American museum objects. Over the years, individuals, native and non-Native alike, have shared with me stories of the uncanny—as these relate to the experience of boarding schools and policies of assimilation or as they relate to the frustration and anger many have felt concerning the removal of human remains and material objects form their original cultural settings. In both settings, many Indigenous people have experienced trauma, oppression, and uncertainty, the kinds of conditions that seem to elicit hauntings. This essay is the result of stories told to me while I worked in museum or was in the process of conducting research on other topics. And whether it was a conversation in passing or a formal interview, the information was shared with me in order to further illuminate how the dynamics among “power,” sacred sites, traditional folklore, and/or material objects operate. Power for many American Indians, including the Lakota, is fixed in place. For Lakota people, sacred sites include the Black Hills, Bear Butte, Harney Peak, the Badlands, and Pipestone.3 Bear Butte has been a site for vision quests for the Lakota Sioux and Cheyenne for thousands of years. The eastern edge of the Black Hills in South Dakota, the area where the first peoples emerged, has been a focal point for religious activity involving sun dances, prayers, and fasting and prophecies. Pipestone also serves as an important religious site for many tribes, but in particular for the Dakota Sioux. For centuries, people have mined the red stone in eastern Minnesota in order to make the sacred pipe, pipe bowls, and other objects. Again, these sites serve as access points between the physical world and the realm of the spirits. Dreams, visions, and aberration are part of the lived reality of many Indian people, as are ghosts, spirits and witches. Indian traditionalists believe that those spiritual powers have control over their lives, and they use protective medicines and take precautions to keep themselves safe. It is a life where the metaphysical is more powerful than the physical world, and where certain ceremonies and important rites, performed at specific sacred sites, such as Bear Butte, **are necessary for protection or blessings for individuals and communities as people seek deeper communion with those powers greater than themselves.**4

#### The United States since its inception has been fascinated with Native spiritual connectivity to the Land—making the acquisition of Native Land the primary strategy for the first wave of colonization on Native peoples to forge a unified, assimilated, and nationalistic “American Identity”

Kavanagh 11 (\*Sarah Schnyder Kavanagh pg. 154-158 Sarah Schneider Kavanagh's research focuses on the pedagogy of teacher education Postdoctoral Scholar at the University of Washington, “Haunting Remains: Educating a New American Citizenry at Indian Hill Cemetery”, Phantom Past, Indigenous Presence: Native Ghosts in North American Culture/ made in 2011/ edited by Colleen E. Boyd & thrush \*editorial chapters done by multiple authors, Kavanagh is one section // EBOOK DOA 9/1/16 KAE+GK)

Although the American Revolution marked the birth of the new nation-state, it was not until several decades later that U.S. citizens realized that their experimental government could transform into a lasting republic. American victories in the War of 1812 revealed that a unified national culture and history could help the United States become a “nation among nations.”12 In his discussion of the cultural roots of nationalism, Benedict Anderson writes that “nation-states… always loom out of an immemorial past, and, still more important, glide into a limitless future.”13 And so as American citizens realized that their experiment in republican government had this potential for a “limitless future,” they were faced with the daunting task of constructing for themselves an “immemorial past.” Wince accomplishing this task would be no small feat, it is not surprising that the end of the War of 1812 marked the beginning of what Blanche Linden-Ward has termed the “American monument-building era”—how better to construct the immemorial than with monuments and memorials? This era was defined by an explosion of cultural and artistic production in support of the men and principles that had founded the nation: a carving of a new U.S. history into old American stone.14 In 1836 Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote, “Our age is retrospective. It builds the sepulchers of the fathers. It writes biographies, history, criticism. The foregoing generation beheld God and nature face to face; we, through their eyes.”15 Although American history was being consciously constructed through many forms, including literature, painting, and oratory, it is no surprise that Emerson highlights the building of “sepulchers of the fathers” as the primary project of his era. Early-nineteenth-century scholars were quite aware of the implications of the fixation on tomb building. This fixation was made most visible through the Rural Cemetery Movement,16 an integral development in the conscious construction of U.S. history.17 In 1850 the creation of Indian Hill cemetery marked the spread of the mid-nineteenth-century monument-building fever into Middletown, Connecticut. The cemetery project, much like rural cemetery projects all along the east coast, was at its heart a patriotic enterprise.18 In his speech at the Indian Hill Cemetery dedication, Olin discussed how the site would instill patriotism in its visitors: “I trust I am no visionary, but I also give credit, in advance, to this enterprise for contributing something towards erecting a past for posterity—towards establishing a common centre for edifying remembrances and holy associations—a common ground where we of the present may wait to greet the men of the future, to commune with them and impart such lessons of wisdom as we have in store. I venture, also, to rely upon this improvement to strengthen, or even to create in some individuals and families much-needed local attachments, so essential an element of real patriotism.”19 Olin’s focus on the patriotic purpose of the new cemetery echoes the sentiments of speakers at cemetery dedication ceremonies across the country during the nineteenth century.20 The rural-cemetery movement as a whole was informed by the needs of the monument-building era: **the goal was to create national identity through the construction of an American past rooted in American soil.** Such attempts at U.S. cultural production were often critiqued by European artists and scholars who agreed that architecture and art would be unsuccessful in creating a national culture and inciting true patriotism if the aesthetics used were borrowed and not developed “Indigenously.”21 In spite of these critiques, the decades following the War of 1812 saw countless artistic attempts aimed at the construction of a national past. Linden-Ward claims that the “creation of public monuments and pastoral cemetery landscapes revealed Americans’ ability to adapt borrowed aesthetic forms to create their own usable past through self commemoration.”22 However, nineteenth-century American must have agreed, at least in part, with European critiques. Even a brief glimpse into the relationship of the United States to both European and Native American populations makes clear that Euro-Americans “borrowed” much more than “aesthetic forms” to create a distinctly American past**. They borrowed, appropriated, and abstracted native American identities in order to create a U.S. national identity and lay claim to American land. Without a claim to land upon which to anchor their nascent nation, Euro-Americans’ claim to nationhood was unsustainable.** Richard Grusin argues, “The construction of American identity has always been inseparable from nature. Unlike European nations, whose identity derived from a common language, ethnic or racial heritage, religion, or cultural history, the identity of the United States of America as ‘nature’s nation’ **was grounded in** large part in **the land itself**.”23 Because of this connection between land and nation, non-Natives have attempted to claim Indigenous identities to validate their own construction of national identity.24 **The first claim is that Indigenous peoples belong to whites as a child belongs to a parent. Second, Indigenous identities have been claimed through the appropriation of Indigenous symbols, actions, and histories.** These Euro-American claims to Indigenous identity manifest themselves in the histories and mythologies that Euro-Americans have created to stabilize their nation.25 From the American Revolution to the present day, examples abound of whites donning faux-Indian attire, yelping ultra-stereotyped war whoops, or engaging in stereotyped “Indian” rituals in moments of national crisis. In Playing Indian, Philip Deloria argues that these actions are associated with the white American need to dissociate with Europe and claim a different national heritage. He argues that whites covet what they have historically viewed as the Native connection to the land and its spirit.26 This is in part because a sense of place and an attachment to the land were prerequisites for the creation of a U.S. national identity. The Boston mayor Josiah Quincy stated in 1813 that “loyalty to place” was the nineteenth-century U.S. citizen’s primary connection with the nation.27 Ideas about the relationship between “loyalty to place” and national identity were not foreign to Middletown residents in the mid-nineteenth century. In fact, Stephen Olin spoke to the need for a loyalty to place in his speech at the 1850 opening of Indian Hill Cemetery. Discussing the creation of the cemetery, he expressed his “strong hope that [it] and similar improvements [that had] become so common in [the United States], [would] contribute, in some small measure, towards providing for one of the most urgent, though little appreciated wants for our great republic… the want of local attachments, and in so far as this essential element is concerned of love of country.”28 Olin, like many nineteenth-century whites, was dedicated to the task of connecting his vision for the nation to the American landscape. In order to implant a national vision into the land itself, whites needed to grapp le not only with the history of American citizens and their forefathers but also with the Native peoples Indigenous to the land. In order for the United States to become a legitimate nation, it had to become, as one unknown writer said in 1828 “a perfect union of the past and present; the rigor of a nation just born walking over the hallowed ashes of a race whose history is too early for a record, and surrounded by the living forms of people hovering between the two.”29 The drive for this perfect union of Native past with white present led whites toward two courses of action in their relations with Native peoples. First, if white Americans were to posit any claim over the land, they had to adopt the history, identity, and “spirit of the land” that belonged to the Native peoples Indigenous to the continent and glorify it, since it held such a central position in any sense of American nation.30 Second, through attempts at the ethnocide of Native American populations, whites tried to transform living societies into “the hallowed ashes of a race.” As I will explore in the next section, this ethnocide was carried out both in the flesh and by the pen.”

#### Since Wounded Knee, U.S. colonialism has entered the late stage—domination of the same kind but different form. The colonial spectre has possessed the nuclear industry, where the state disguises its imperialism in the form of development, coercing Native peoples to acquire and destroy the Land for nuclear waste dumping—this is the final conquest of the Frontier

Angel 91 (Bradley an international leader in the environmental health and justice movement, working with communities to stop pollution threats and to promote pollution prevention) “The Toxic Threat to Indian Lands” Greenpeace 1991 <http://www.ejnet.org/ej/toxicthreattoindianlands.pdf> DOA: 8.11.16//KAE+GK)

Five hundred years ago explorer Christopher Columbus sailed from Europe, setting in motion a series of events leading to the genocidal war on Indigenous people in whose land he arrived uninvited. Hoping to claim these already inhabited lands for European royalty, invading European armies plundered the civilizations they came upon. Untold millions of Indigenous people were killed and enslaved, their cultures violently attacked and their way of life changed forever. Five hundred years later, the exploitation and assault on Indigenous people and their land continues. Instead of conquistadors armed with weapons of destruction and war, the new assault is disguised as “economic development” promoted by entrepreneurs pushing poisonous technologies. The modern day invaders from the waste disposal industry promise huge amounts of money, make vague promises about jobs, and make exaggerated and often false claims about the alleged safety of their dangerous proposals. Frustrated by intense grassroots opposition and complex permitting procedures in other communities across the United States, the waste disposal industry and **the U.S.** government **have set their aim on what they believe to be the most vulnerable segment of society:** Indian people and **Indian land.** Today, hundreds of Indian Nations (Tribes) are being approached by both the waste disposal industry and the United States Government in search of new dumping grounds for the unwanted toxic, nuclear, medical and solid waste of industrial society. Hoping to take advantage of the devastating chronic unemployment, pervasive poverty and sovereign status of Indian Nations, the waste disposal industry and the U.S. government have embarked on an all-out effort to site incinerators, landfills, nuclear waste storage facilities and similar polluting industries on Tribal land. The waste industry strenuously denies that they are targeting Indian lands, and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Bureau of Indian Affairs officials downplay and underestimate the extent of industry’s efforts: the facts, however, contradict the waste industry’s claims and instead **reveal a concerted effort to turn Indian lands into the dumping grounds for America’s poisons.** Established companies such as Bechtel and Waste Tech (a subsidiary of Amoco Oil) have been joined by fly-by-night operators hoping to get rich quick **by turning the last remaining land still controlled by Indian people into America’s new dumping ground.** For example, lawyers for Bechtel have approached numerous tribes offering everything from hazardous and solid waste to nuclear waste dumps to nuclear power plants. A Waste Tech representative even admitted publicly during a meeting on the Kaibab-Paiute Reservation (located near the Arizona-Utah border) that their company hoped to site five commercial hazardous waste incinerators on five geographically distinct Indian Reservations in the United States. Waste Tech has publicly admitted to contacting about 15 tribes as of mid-1990, according to Ted Bryant, a Choctaw Cherokee Indian who is a middle man in some of the deals involving Waste Tech (reported in the St. Louis Post Dispatch, July 15, 1990). The overtures of the waste industry initially succeeded in making inroads with numerous tribal officials and governments. Many agreements were signed between company and tribal officials giving the initial go-ahead for proposed waste disposal facilities, usually without the knowledge or consent of the Tribal membership. As the truth about the serious threats posed by these projects to the peoples health, environment, culture, traditions and sovereignty becomes known, resistance by Indian people has spread rapidly.

#### The settler colonizes and dominates the Frontier to quarantine and then destroy the last remaining part of Native subjecthood—the Land. Colonial spatial strategies establish Natives as non-normative, unfit for life, and dead, reifying the power of metanarratives painting the Native subject’s inevitable fatality

Kavanagh 11 (\*Sarah Schnyder Kavanagh pg. 168-171 Sarah Schneider Kavanagh's research focuses on the pedagogy of teacher education Postdoctoral Scholar at the University of Washington, “Haunting Remains: Educating a New American Citizenry at Indian Hill Cemetery”, Phantom Past, Indigenous Presence: Native Ghosts in North American Culture/ made in 2011/ edited by Colleen E. Boyd & thrush \*editorial chapters done by multiple authors, Kavanagh is one section // EBOOK DOA 9/1/16 KAE+GK)

**The Frontier Myth provides an easily conceptualized spatial boundary between the civilized self and the primitive other.** For nineteenth-century believers in the Frontier Myth, the primitive, Indian other was conceptualized always on the other side of the imaginary line of the frontier; the other always occupied other spaces. The myth was so pervasive that White Middletown residents began thinking of the Indian as beyond the frontier line even while Native peoples remained living and working in their city.65 All cemeteries take on the task of **quarantining non-normative others, the dead, on the other side of real spatial boundaries**. In the case of Indian Hill Cemetery, the Indian is quarantined alongside, and thus equated with, the dead. Through the drawing of boundaries to keep out “other peoples,” both cemeteries and the frontier clearly illustrate the relationships of power that are the foundations of place. **The cemetery and the frontier are intentionally constructed as physical manifestations of power.** In “Of Other Spaces,” Michel Foucault outlines a theory of heterotopias. Foucault’s theory of heterotopias approaches places themselves (and particularly the cemetery, which he uses as a primary example of a heterotopia) as social texts. Although Foucault does not mention the Frontier Myth in his analysis of heterotopic spaces, his heterotopia and the frontier have much in common. Understanding the commonalities between these two spaces is useful in understanding the relationship between frontier mythology and Indian Hill Cemetery. In his theory of heterotopias, **Foucault analyzes how a space created to house the deviant constructs space for the “normal.” A heterotopia is a place that incites thought about what society is, by portraying what it is not, a place that sparks imagination about what should be, by displaying that which deviates from the norm.**66 It is, in effect, a boundary between two worlds that contains and orders deviance, presenting an idealized version of normative society. Foucault’s heterotopia and the frontier both exist as abstracted spaces of interaction not only between the normative and the deviant, but also between the past and the present. Similar to the frontier, heterotopias are “often linked to slices in time… [and] begin to function at full capacity when men arrive at a sort of absolute break with their traditional time.”67 To inhabit a cemetery, permanent residents (the dead) must break with real time. Visitors, through viewing the living quarters of the long-since dead, experience a break in traditional time as well. Through these temporal breakages, the cemetery fulfills “the idea of constituting a place of all times that is itself outside of time and inaccessible to its ravages, the projects of organizing in this way a sort of perpetual and indefinite accumulation of time in an immobile place.”68 The cemetery becomes the timeless reflection of the city it stands outside of, reflecting a universalized and timeless society back onto itself in idealized, yet inverted form: a “city of the dead” to promote life in a city of the living. Foucault describes the role of a heterotopia as creating “a space that is other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled.”69 The heterotopic cemetery here becomes an idealized version of the city, displacing the city itself and ordering its complications into an organized form. Blanche Linden-Ward argues that Mount Auburn Cemetery was constructed as a complementary and idealized “city on a hill” that would “offer lessons to the entire nation.”70 In both Mount Auburn Cemetery and Indian Hill Cemetery, the “mess, ill constructed, and jumbled” nature of real life is idealized through the easily organized dead. History, struggle, controversy, societal structure, family, and race relations are displayed through the structure of the rural cemetery as timeless and structured, meticulously arranged and seemingly inevitable. Indian Hill Cemetery presents an idealized mirror image of a particular social structure in several specific ways. As can be seen on the 1850 map of the original Indian Hill Cemetery, almost all of the trails that meander across the hill have faux-Indian names. There are a few paths that are named after actual Wangunk people who had been proprietors of the site prior to 1850. For example, “Sowheage Ave.” can be found on the southeastern corner of the hill. Some evidence indicates that this particular path marks the spot where the remains of Sowheage, a Wangunk leader, were found and exhumed, although this cannot be verified.71 Evidence indicates that the exhumation of Native bodies at Wune Wahjet was commonplace in the years preceding the creation of the cemetery.72 While the corporeal evidence of Wangunk people has been erased, evidence of what Robert Berkhofer has termed “the white man’s Indian”73 have been systematically moved into the site through faux-Indian path names, plaques at the entry to the cemetery that depict Noble Savage-like profiles, and the words of the Revs. Olin and Goodwin. Indian Hill Cemetery is bounded by its outermost path, which is called “Mattebeseck Ave.” Mattebeseck, the Wangunk name for the city of Middletown, becomes the outer boundary of this mirror city, this city of the dead. In an ironic twist of fate, the Wangunk are given full ownership of Wune Wahjet, but this ownership comes with the price of forever being understood as the definition of death itself. **The** Wangunk **city** of Mattebeseck **is remembered only by its own death and is re-created as an embodiment of inevitable death.**

#### Thus, I advocate that we speak *with* the haunting Native specters as a strategy to exorcise nuclear colonial power.

#### Haunting is the real strategy—hegemonic power structures are intrinsically spectral, meaning other starting points are flawed. As the material conditions of Native Americans have dwindled, the only viable option is to haunt the white subject to prevent Native erasure.

Kavanagh 11 (\*Sarah Schnyder Kavanagh pg. 171-173 Sarah Schneider Kavanagh's research focuses on the pedagogy of teacher education Postdoctoral Scholar at the University of Washington, “Haunting Remains: Educating a New American Citizenry at Indian Hill Cemetery”, Phantom Past, Indigenous Presence: Native Ghosts in North American Culture/ made in 2011/ edited by Colleen E. Boyd & thrush \*editorial chapters done by multiple authors, Kavanagh is one section // EBOOK DOA 9/1/16 KAE+GK)

According to Jaques Derrida “haunting belongs to the structure of every hegemony.” Renee Bergland, in The National Uncanny: Indian ghosts and American subjects, has unpacked Derrida’s statement thusly: “Power is unreal, insubstantial, somehow imaginary. At the same time, of course, it is undeniably real. **When we describe hegemonies as socially constructed, we mean that they are built on history, memory, fear and desire. They are made from the same things that ghosts are made from.** Because the politics of the national, the racial, the classed and the gendered are the politics of memory and false memory, they are also, necessarily, the politics of spectrality.” Paining Derrida and Bergland’s analysis of haunting with Richard White’s analysis of place (which states that places enact power and are constructed within hegemonic systems) leads me to claim that **all places are haunted**. Perhaps Indian Hill cemetery is a revealing site for an analysis of place as a haunting and haunted actor not because it is extraordinary, but because it is so ordinary, so commonplace. Through the haunting of Indian ghosts, through the construction of mythic Indian tropes, and through the presentation of national narrative mythologies, Indian Hill Cemetery haunts the very city it serves. **The place (re)presents power structures that are at once real and imaginary, tangible and insubstantial, here and not here. These tropes**, mythologies, and power structures **have been constructed** locally, nationally and internationally **for** **hundreds of years**, “built on history, memory, fear and desire.” “they are made,” Bergland observes, “from the same things that ghosts are made from.” And, in turn, ghosts have been made from them. The names and structures at Indian Hill Cemetery are physical metaphors that transmit ideological narratives. Tombstones, landscape design, and the name of the site itself are all tangible structures that stand in for and arrange into a meticulous order the “messy, ill constructed and jumbled” concepts of nation and race. These structural metaphors are haunted by the messages they were created to impart. At Indian Hill, hauntings are complicated by the fact that the Indian Ghost (that Olin suggests haunts the site) is itself a constructed structural metaphor. As discussed above, the Indian Ghost is introduced into the discourse surrounding Indian Hill Cemetery as a metaphor for the inevitable death of Native peoples; **it is a tool for Indigenous erasure**. If the Indian ghost itself is a structural metaphor, and metaphors are haunted by the messages that they impart, then, at Indian Hill, haunting ghosts are themselves haunted. The verb “to haunt” is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “of unseen or immaterial visitants.” Thus, the creation of a metaphor is in fact the created of a haunted symbol. If a metaphor is defined by the simultaneous absence and presence of the “something else” that it is suggestive of, a metaphor then is a symbol that is constantly accompanied by that which is unseen or immaterial. Metaphors, symbols, and representations are all inherently haunted. What does the haunted nature of metaphor mean for a structure such as Indian Hill Cemetery, whose central metaphor is an Indian ghost? Could it be that the metaphoric ghost of Indian Hill is haunted not by the “imaginary or spiritual beings” but by narrative ideologies of nation, race, ethnocide, and removal? Could it be that at Indian Hill cemetery eve the ephemeral is haunted? In the speeches presented at the dedication ceremony, physical realities of history are treated as legend, and legends of lingering ghosts are treated as fact. **The physical fact of Native existence is denied, while the ephemeral Indian ghost is ensconced.** Indian Hill Cemetery was created to instill haunting citizenship into Middletown residents. In Olin’s words, the cemetery exerts “a real and powerful, though silent influence, in molding the character, and in exalting and purifying the sentiments of a people.” This “silent influence’ is attained through a manipulation of “Indian-ness” in an attempt to construct non-Native American history and identity and also through an expansion of spatial frontier mythology in Middletown. The cemetery was a project aimed at expanding patriotism and active citizenship. The site’s founders approached this project by creating Indian ghosts and erasing Native bodies. Indian Hill cemetery was established in an attempt to ensure that, **even as the visible remains of native people were removed, the special Indian, ghosted and forever haunting white citizenry, remains.**

#### The haunting of ghosts bridge the gap between past and present and articulate what haven’t and cannot be expressed. The remembrance in Spectrality is key to disrupt and expose contradictions of narratives of continuity that prop up settler domination

Richardson 05 (Judith Richardson Possessions: The History and Uses of Haunting in the Hudson Valley page 26-27 September 26, 2005 Judith Richardson is Assistant Professor in the English Department at [Stanford University](http://www.stanford.edu/) DOA 8/31/16 //KAE+GK)

**These types and images are not unique to the Hudson Valley: they echo larger traditions and iconographies**. Yet the fact that is many of the ghosts of the region are so inchoate or faded, so incapable of being identified, has aesthetic and historical implications. Embedded in these depictions of ghosts is a problem of communication, a los of essential information, an inability to articulate—something reflected further in the general silence of the Hudson Valley’s ghostly population. European ghosts often speak; New York area ghosts rarely do.67 Like the ghosts that Rip Van Winkle encounters in the Catskill recesses, who disturb him most by the fact that “they maintained the gravest faces, the most mysterious silence,” Hudson Valley ghosts are often either dead silent or, when they do try to communicate, are heard as muffled or otherwise incomprehensible.68 And in many cases ghosts rob witnesses of the power of speech as well, defying description and eroding verbal expression.69 The indescribable, unspeakable aspects of ghosts may simply stem from crises of abysmal horror or mourning. Yet the inarticulacy that defines is many instance of haunting in the Hudson Valley also shadows problems of historical continuity, of perennial change as repeatedly and cumulatively obscuring the regional past and undermining historical understanding. It is telling that whereas Irving describes the ghostly crew of “The Storm-Ship” as chanting, a late-nineteenth-century retelling says they chant “words devoid of meaning to the listners.”70 The fault, of course, lies not with the ghosts, but with the observers. That is, if traces of the past presented themselves, if waves of settlers and visitors suspected things had happened here, they were largely at a loss to identify them or to understand their implications.

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best recognizes the presence of spectrality. The specter is A priori to any ethical obligation or practice as it is the origin of such ethics, to live in and of it demands a politics of memory be burdened upon the individual. Life and death are one; the small passageway connecting the two is the resting place of memory.

Derrida 94’ Jacques Derrida, “Specters of Marx”, 1994, P 17 <http://m.friendfeed-media.com/411d68a9b887290f0f6a1621dad4ad2249ea7421>//KAE

But to learn to live, to learn it from oneself and by oneself, all alone, to teach oneself to live ("I would like to learn to live finally"), is that not impossible for a living being? Is it not what logic itself forbids? To live, by definition, is not something one learns. Not from oneself, it is not learned from life, taught by life. Only from the other and by death. In any case from the other at the edge of life. At the internal border or the external border, it is a heterodidactics between life and death. And yet nothing is more necessary than this wisdom. It is ethics itself: to learn to live-alone, from oneself, by oneself. Life does not know how to live otherwise. And does one ever do anything else but learn to live, alone, from oneself, by oneself? This is, therefore, a strange commitment, both impossible and necessary, for a living being supposed to be alive: "I would like to learn to live." It has no sense and cannot be just unless it comes to terms with death.2 Mine as (well as) that of the other. Between life and death, then, this is indeed the place of a sententious injunction that always feigns to speak like the just. What follows advances like an essay in the night-into the unknown of that which must remain to come-a simple attempt, therefore, to analyze with some consistency such an exordium: "I would like to learn to live. Finally" Finally what. If it - learning to live - remains to be done, it can happen only between life and death. Neither in life nor in death alone. What happens between two, and between all the "two's" one likes, such as between life and death, can only maintain itself with some ghost, can only talk with or about some ghost [s' entretenir de quelque fantomeJ. So it would be necessary to learn spirits. Even and especially if this, the spectral, is not. Even and especially if this, which is neither substance, nor essence, nor existence, is never present as such. The time of the "learning to live, a time without tutelary present, would amount to this, to which the exordium is leading us: to learn to live with ghosts, in the upkeep, the conversation, the company, or the companionship, in the commerce without commerce of ghosts. To live otherwise, and better. No, not better, but more justly. But with them. No being-with the other, no socius without this with that makes being-with in general more enigmatic than ever for us. And this being-with specters would also be, not only but also, a politics of memory, of inheritance, and of generations. If I am getting ready to speak at length about ghosts, inheritance, and generations, generations of ghosts, which is to say about certain others who are not present, nor presently living, either to us, in us, or outside us, it is in the name of justice. Of justice where it is not yet, not yet there, where it is no longer, let us understand where it is no longer present, and where it will never be, no more than the law, reducible to laws or rights.3 It is necessary to speak of the ghost, indeed to the ghost and with it, from the moment that no ethics, no politics, whether revolutionary or not, seems possible and thinkable and just that does not recognize in its principle the respect for those others who are no longer or for those others who are not yet there, presently living, whether they are already dead or not yet born.

# 1AR Overviews

# Topicality/T Frontlines

## Gen 1AR

### Miller

#### Their interpretation is an attempt to create pure community but lots of debaters fall outside their interpretation. Because of that unbridgeable gap the idea of a community is autoimmune. Turning debate into a community reduces alterity by herding difference making ethics impossible.

Miller ‘9 (J. Hillis Miller, “For Derrida” 2009 Fordham University Press pg. 130-131, Miller is an American literary critic who has been heavily influenced by—and who has heavily influenced—deconstruction—Harvard and Oberlin grad.)

On the next page Derrida claims we would not say we want to belong to the family or community if we really did belong to one or the other: "The desire to belong to any community whatsoever, the desire for be-longing tout court, implies that one does not belong" (TS, z8). This is our happy chance, since my only road to responsible ethical relations to my neighbor, the "wholly other," is by detaching myself from family or com-munity, or by recognizing that I am always already and for good detached, enisled. I must detach myself from the herd, or appropriate my detachment, in order to escape the doom of autoimmune self-destruction that always awaits such deconstructible agglomerations. I must come to know that I am detached, and that it's a good thing too. The different concepts of being with represented by Derrida and by all those modern thinkers of being with I began by identifying are incompatible. They cannot be synthesized or reconciled. II Put choisir Which do I choose? I wish with all my heart I could believe in Williams's ideal of a happy, classless community or in Heidegger's assumption that Mitsein is a fundamental aspect of being human, but I fear that each man or woman may be an island unto himself or herself, and that real communities are more like the communities of self-destructive autoimmunitv Derrida de-scribes. Certainly the United States these days, if you can dare to think of it as one immense community, is a better example of Derrida's self-destructive autoimmune community than of Williams's community of kindness and mutuality. I claim, moreover, to have confirmed through several examples the tri-ple hypothesis with which I started: (I) that the concept of community, in a given thinker, is consonant with his or her concept of relations between self and other; (2) that you cannot get from Dasein to Mitsein unless you assume from the start that Damn, is Mitsein; (3) that Derrida in his last seminars, almost uniquely among modern philosophers and theorists, affirms the fundamental and irremediable isolation of each Dasein. For Derrida, no isthmus, no bridge, no road, no communication or transfer connects or can ever connect my enisled self to other selves. There is no common world. There are only islands. Any community is an artificial, deconstructible, construct fabricated out of words or other signs. Any community, moreover, is self-destructively autoimmunitary to boot. One should not underestimate the consequences of holding that each human being is, throughout his or her lifetime, enisled.

## T- countries

### #general

#### 1. The concept of defining “countries” and boundaries is a colonial strategy to commodify indigenous selfhood. Their boundary-based logic is an attempt to colonize Native lands and subvert Native sovereignty. We must redraw the map.

Reed 09 (T. V. Reed, Toxic Colonialism, Environmental Justice, and Native Resistance in Silko's "Almanac of the Dead", 2009, Oxford University Press, Accessed 8/20/16, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20532677>, p 32, T. V. Reed is director of American studies and professor of English at Washington State University. //GK)

Not only are the forces of resistance far from pure, but they also are portrayed as facing deeply disturbing, dehumanizing forces arising from colonialist capitalism's increasing objectification, commoditization, and degradation of people and environments. The logic of economic objectification and the text's strategy of countering it are apparent even before the novel officially begins, in the map that precedes the first chapter. Mapping was one of the key objectifying strategies that enabled colonialist expropriation, and thus might seem a strange place for the text to begin. But this map is quite subversive. While it shows that imaginary line called a border, it labels only Mexico, not that other place even farther from God. The map is hardly to scale, and it is covered with names of characters and pithy encapsulations of prophecies that foretell "the disappearance of all things European" from the Americas and a revolutionary "return of all tribal lands." This reclaiming of mapping parallels the overall strategy of the text, which uses the Western literary form of the novel to offer a devastating critique of Euro-colonial culture and weaves into this alien literary form the prophetic counter-stories of the spiritually present ancestors and their living heirs.

#### 2. x-apply Kavanagh 11 that says “Indian other was conceptualized always on the other side of the imaginary line of the frontier; the other always occupied other spaces. The myth was so pervasive that White Middletown residents began thinking of the Indian as beyond the frontier line even while Native peoples remained living and working in their city.65 All cemeteries take on the task of quarantining non-normative others, the dead, on the other side of real spatial boundaries. In the case of Indian Hill Cemetery, the Indian is quarantined alongside, and thus equated with, the dead. Through the drawing of boundaries to keep out “other peoples,””

#### This means:

#### T is an impact booster for the AC because they are drawing the specter of colonialism to further possess the debate space

#### Turns any education args because logic of their definition functionally constructs Native Americans a non-normative other, forcing voices into exclusion inside of debate—means they deny the Other to access education

#### I also control fairness as an internal to education because their definition constrains the voices that are permitted to be heard

### Implies plural

#### I meet— Native American populations are plural groups of people; oxford

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american\_english/native-american

Na·tive A·mer·i·can noun noun: Native American; plural noun: Native Americans 1.  a member of any of the indigenous peoples of the Americas.

### Defend all countries

### Geographical location

#### First overview. The concept of defining “countries” and boundaries is a colonial strategy to commodify indigenous selfhood. Their boundary-based logic is an attempt to colonize Native lands and subvert Native sovereignty. We must redraw the map.

Reed 09 (T. V. Reed, Toxic Colonialism, Environmental Justice, and Native Resistance in Silko's "Almanac of the Dead", 2009, Oxford University Press, Accessed 8/20/16, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20532677>, p 32, T. V. Reed is director of American studies and professor of English at Washington State University. //GK)

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## T – resolved

### 1. implies action

## T – prohibit

### 1. formally forbid by law

### 2. not allowed

### 3. make impossible

## T – production

### 1. natural production

### 2. making for sales

### 3. process (of energy)

## T—nuclear power

### 1. atomic reaction

### 2. fission

### 3. uranium

## T—the

### 1. defend all production

* aff is talking about stuff that happened in the past

# Framework Extensions

### Spectrality Performance Good

#### Our actions within the round set precedence for spectral education, that is to say, the effects of spectral guidance uniquely impact education- creation and discovery are entirely consumed by ghosts, these two actions are our subconscious responding to the world around us. Our form of pedagogy conveys onto everything a sense of haunting; it is the point in between representative of the correlation between life and death. We are the teachers conveying unto all who witnesses the 1AC the event that transpires from the event itself.

Caputo, John D. (Professor at Syracuse University) “Teaching the Event: Deconstruction, Hauntology, and the Scene of Pedagogy” pgs28-29//kAE

How can we bring about the event? The very attempt to bring about the event would prevent the event. It breaks in upon us unforeseen, uninvited. Still, there is a certain conjuring of the event, a certain dark art of requesting an apparition. It is possible, Derrida says, to be inventive about the eventive, playing on the old sense of both the Latin “*inventio”* and the French “*invention*,” both to invent and to discover or come upon. We must be inventive in order to allow its in-coming (*invenire*). 11 That means getting over a fear of ghosts, being willing to live with strange noises in the night, being hospitable to spooks. It means conjuring the spirits that keep the system open to the event, that keep the system in play, embracing the spooky effects of a quasi-transcendental disequilibrium, living in an elusive state of instability, in a word, a magnificent word coined by James Joyce, “chaosmic,” meaning a state that is neither chaos nor cosmos. Either pure order or pure disorder would prevent the event. When Derrida calls this “deconstruction,” he invites the misunderstanding of radical chaos, implying that he is out to raze institutions instead of merely meaning to spook them. He is not recommending pure anarchy or a libertarian anti-institutionalism; he has in mind a positive idea of institutions as a scene of the event. Deconstruction is all about institutions — schools, hospitals, political bodies, courts, museums — and how to keep them in creative disequilibrium without tipping over, how to spook their complacency with the promise/risk of the future. What is truly destructive is the opposite of the event, which is the absolute exorcism of the event by the “program,” absolute foreseeability, deducibility, rule governed activity. When the “program” is in place, what happens is a function of the laws of the system, of a rigorous logic, not of the aphoristic, metaphoristic, grammatological energy of the event. The only possible program is to program the unprogrammable, the unforeseeable. Otherwise the ghost or spirit of the event will have fled the premises. All the aporias surrounding justice and democracy, education and the gift, are problems of the event. All the problems of teaching, of what Gert Biesta calls “subjectification,”12 are aporias of the event, of becoming a subject of the event, of responding to the call of the event — ever since Socrates tried to figure out a way to make students (the patients) the agent of their own instruction, to figure out how students could come to see for themselves, to be struck by the event, instead of simply being stung by Socrates; ever since Søren Kierkegaard tried to get existing individuals to assume responsibility for themselves, without being responsible to Kierkegaard. The teacher must somehow allow the event to happen without standing between the student and the event, without attempting to manipulate the event. The teacher must figure out how to be a weak force, how the middle voice works, how to be an agent without agency, a provocateur who is not an agent, how to engage the spooky dynamics of a haunting spirit. What is the spectral effect that takes place in teaching? According to the hauntological principle, we should say the event in education is not what happens but what is going on in what happens. What happens is teaching, the schools, but something is going on in what happens, something desired with a desire beyond desire, something unforeseeable, something impossible, uncontainable, something coming in and as an absolute future. When this or that is taught, that is what is happening, but the event is what is going in what happens, which we cannot get our hands on, cannot master or manipulate, cannot make happen, but only conjure up. The event is a matter of “indirect” communication, Kierkegaard would say; the teacher is only a midwife of the event, Socrates would say. Teaching does not directly handle the event.

#### We have raped and pillaged their land, forced them into enclosures, ignored their stories and belittled their cries – scholars must now turn our gaze towards their colonial pasts and feel the presence of their ghosts who recant the spectrality of their past. Without the spectre we continue to colonize justice and future actions and fall into a fantasy of reconciliation.

Cameron 08 cultural geographies essay Indigenous spectrality and the politics of postcolonial ghost stories Emilie Cameron Queen’s University 2008 <http://cgj.sagepub.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/content/15/3/383.full.pdf+html> // KAE

These comments highlight the specific, lived experience of ghostliness and not a generalized, metaphoric condition of Indigenous spectrality. Spivak has highlighted the importance of drawing a distinction between the singular and the general in accounts of the colonial and postcolonial.50 She emphasizes the importance of understanding the ‘singular’ not so much as an instance of the general, but rather as that which marks, in Baucom’s words, a ‘cryptic, secretive space..., discloses the presence of that withheld space, but “guards” its secret’.51 In other words, as Baucom has argued in reference to the generalized sense of haunting evoked by stories of the drowning of 132 slaves on the Atlantic crossing of the Zong in 1781, post- colonial scholars must pay attention to the ways in which singular, specific historical experiences and events are translated into generalized allegories of a reprehensible colonial past. He insists that the specificity of these histories must be stripped away in order for them to circulate as evocative signs of ‘that kind’ of history, and that the ‘value’ of a specific history is only legible in this generalized state. There is a certain violence, then, in the evocation of a general sense of haunted (un)settlement in places like the Stein Valley. **It is a haunting that speaks** not to the particular ways in which Nlaka’pamux have experienced and objected to colonial policies and practices (experiences and concerns that they specifically articulated, for example, to Gilbert Malcolm Sproat, Joint Indian Reserve Commissioner, as Sproat traveled through their territory in the summer of 1878, tasked with allotting small reserve lands for the use of the Nlaka’pamux and thus clearing the way for non-Aboriginal settlement),52 but rather to a generalized sense of the contemporary resonance of ‘that kind’ of history. This generalized and allegorical understanding of the colonial past inevitably leads, Baucom argues, to an equally generalized ‘fantasy’53 of postcolonial justice, to the notion of reconciliation with ghosts rather than a reckoning with the specific and ongoing violences of colonialism. ‘In poll after poll, Canadians have said that they want to see justice done for Aboriginal people, but they have not known how’,54 reports the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, in spite of the fact that Aboriginal peoples have consistently and forcefully articulated their specific demands for justice. What does it mean, then, to be ‘haunted’ in a decolonizing settler colony like British Columbia? Who is haunted in these stories, and who or what is doing the haunting? What kind of future might these hauntings demand? Do they signal, as Derrida intended, a recognition of the always unfinished and unfinishable in our relation to the present and past and, by extension, a sense of generosity and hospitality towards ghosts? Or do they, as Sarah Ahmed55 has argued in relation to white guilt in postcolonial Australia, constitute yet another self-referential engagement with the colonial past, in which the experiences and desires of the settler occlude consideration of other desires and possibilities? This is the reason for my wariness in the face of haunting tropes, for I fear that postcolonial ghost stories risk perpetuating a kind of endless ‘dancing around a wound’56 that Daniel David Moses identifies among liberal, left-leaning Canadians, anxiously replaying their complicity in an ugly colonial past while neglecting to mobilize effectively for change in the present. The ghosts of the Stein do not seem to me to represent the Nlaka’pamux with very much dignity or agency, and surely any postcolonial trope we might mobilize ought at the very least to figure Indigenous peoples with dignity. In Haraway’s terms, it seems to me that ‘haunting’ has the potential to function as a particularly ‘deadly’ trope, one that requires the death and immateriality of Indigenous peoples to make an e/affective claim on non-Indigenous British Columbians. It is a trope within which today’s living descendents of the generalized ‘spirits’ haunting the Stein, people like Chiefs Leonard Andrew and Ruby Dunstan, seem to have no place.

#### Using performance in the context of haunting represents the subject as one of presence. The ghosts of the performance calls responsibility and mandates justice to emerge out of performativity – making haunting unique to other narratives.

Powell & Stephenson 09 Liminalities: A Journal of Performance Studies Vol. 5, No. 1, April 2009 On the Haunting of Performance Studies Benjamin D. Powell & Tracy Stephenson Shaffer [http://liminalities.net/5-1/hauntology.pdf Benjamin D. Powell, PhD is an instructor of performance studies in the Department of Theatre and Film at Bowling Green State University. Tracy Stephenson Shaffer is Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at Louisiana State University, where she directs in the HopKins Black Box and teaches courses in performance and film. //](http://liminalities.net/5-1/hauntology.pdf%20%20//) KAE

Haunting is a complicated theoretical approach hard to describe, let alone operate within. Complications arise in any proposal for an epistemology because it makes various assumptions which call into question notions of value, content, form, knowledge, and truth. For people working with haunting, these issues become even more intensely contested because haunting calls these values into question before they arrive as questions. Put simply, if one adopts haunting one will be forced into a radical rethinking of how scholars and performers articulate experience(s). Haunting requires that concepts such as presence, ontology, performativity, and identity be rethought in a way that allows for difference to emerge. The idea of difference must be rethought as well to avoid conceiving of difference in terms of subjectivity or identity. Haunting is an epistemology concerned with the treatment of the other as an ethics of difference. It is precisely because we cannot account for difference from a subjective perspective without risking alienation or (re)instating norms, that we must change the manner in which we conceive of difference, using concepts like presence or performativity in a different way. We argue that such an ethics of radical difference can also be extended to performance studies practice and scholarship.5 Some areas of performance studies that might be reinvestigated using haunting as an epistemology are the relationship between performer and audience, temporality, performativity, presence and absence, and the representation of history in/as performance. Haunting calls accepted notions underlying each of these areas into question and opens them up for different forms of critique to emerge. In order to understand what haunting is(not), we need to examine more closely how Derrida employs haunting in Specters of Marx. Derrida himself recognizes the importance of performance in his reading of Marx via haunting **which operates as a performative interpretation, that is, of an interpretation that transforms the very thing it interprets . . . [this is] a definition of the performative as unorthodox with regard to speech act theory** . . . (‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it’). (Derrida, Specters 51) From the beginning of his text on ghosts and Marx, Derrida constantly operates within such an unorthodox understanding of performativity, which continually transforms the texts and theories that he engages. We argue that such a continual transformation, or increase in productive capacity, of performance theory is necessary to expand how we conceive and practice performance.6 We might use established concepts within performance theory against themselves in order to better highlight the contested nature of performance. That is, an understanding of performativity similar to Butler and Derrida’s: through repeated usage, transformation occurs in the usage itself. This theory of performativity depends upon repetition and not reproduction. Similar to Butler’s theory of performativity and agency, Derrida’s shows the transformative potential of repetition via iterability and the trace through the performative interpretation at work within Specters. The trace is not a presence but the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates itself, displaces itself, refers itself, it properly has no site—erasure belongs to its structure . . . The paradox of such a structure, in the language of metaphysics, is an inversion of metaphysical concepts, which produces the following effect: the present becomes the sign of the sign, the trace of the trace. It is no longer what every reference refers to in the last analysis. It becomes a function in a structure of generalized reference. It is a trace, and a trace of the erasure of the trace. (Derrida, Margins, 24) The trace emerges in a process of iterability via repetition. Where presence is commonly misinterpreted as the result of reproduction, the trace functions as a (non)presence of repetition because it always already has erasure(s) contained within it. For example, during the run of a performance, the performance transforms itself through its repetition night to night. The performance has traces of previous iterations of itself from previous nights. As a performer, one may remember a certain bodily sensation on a certain night, a look from an audience member that moved the performance in a new direction, or even the way it felt as the lights went down. Traces can extend even further into the rehearsal period, historical research, and even certain selections of music that might have been playing while learning lines. Performativity and, more specifically, the trace, destabilize the moment of performance and force scholars and practitioners to (re)orient themselves to their work. For Derrida, justice comes in the form of responsibility to the other as difference. The others who Derrida writes of are both living others and others who have passed. He uses the ghost as a figure that calls attention to both. Individuals have a responsibility to live with the other and treat the other justly. In order to live responsibly then, one must be acutely aware of the socius, the with of the being-with Derrida writes about. The fact that we are among others calls us to be mindful of how we treat each other.

#### Hauntology precedes politics—the central question for ethics should be the specter. We should direct our ethics towards the other that is not present.

Derrida 93 (Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx, 1993, Translated by Peggy Kamuf, p xviii)

If I am getting ready to speak at length about ghosts, inheritance, and generations, generations of ghosts, which is to say about certain others who are not present, nor presently living, either to us, in us, or outside us, it is in the name of justice. Of justice where it is not yet, not yet there, where it is no longer, let us understand where it is no longer present, and where it will never be, no more than the law, reducible to laws or rights. 3 **It is necessary to speak of the ghost, indeed to the ghost and with it, from the moment that no ethics, no politics, whether revolutionary or not,** seems possible and thinkable and just that does not recognize in its principle the respect for those others who are no longer or for those others who are not yet there, presently living, whether they are already dead or not yet born. No justice--let us not **say no law and once again we are not speaking here of laws** 4 -seems possible or thinkable without the principle of some responsibility, beyond all living present, within that which disjoins the living present, before the ghosts of those who are not yet born or who are already dead, be they victims of wars, political or other kinds of violence, nationalist, racist, colonialist, sexist, or other kinds of exterminations, victims of the oppressions of capitalist imperialism or any of the forms of totalitarianism. Without this non-contemporaneity with itself of the living present, without that which secretly unhinges it, without this responsibility and this respect for justice concerning those who are not there, of those who are no longer or who are not yet present and living, what sense would there be to ask the question "where?" "where tomorrow?" "whither?"

### Apologetic Whiteness DA

#### Apologetic Whiteness DA – The desire for dialogic spaces structured by formal and procedural rules only serves to protect white privilege over issues of race.

Leonardo and Porter 12 [Leonardo, Zeus and Porter, Ronald K.(2010) 'Pedagogy of fear: toward a Fanonian theory of 'safety' in race dialogue', Race Ethnicity and Education, 13: 2, 139 — 157 http://gse.berkeley.edu/faculty/ZLeonardo/PedagogyofFear.pdf]

Part of color-blindness is **to demand that race dialogue takes place in a ‘safe’ environ- ment**. This **is tantamount to premising racial pedagogy on assumptions about comfort**, which quickly degrade anti-racist teaching into image and personal management (Thompson 2003). In other words, **the higher goal of understanding and fighting** racism **is exchanged for** creating **a safe space where whites can avoid** publicly ‘**looking racist ’**, which then overwhelms their reasons for participating in racial **dialogue**. **This approach** ironically still **leaves intact** what bell hooks (1992) has called **the ‘terrorizing force of white supremacy’**, even within the context of safety (174). As opposed to this, **critical race pedagogy is inherently risky, uncomfortable, and fundamentally unsafe** (Lynn 1999), particularly for whites. This does not equate with creat- ing a hostile situation but to acknowledges that **pedagogies** that **tackle racial power** will be most uncomfortable for those who benefit from that power. It also acknowl- edges **that mainstream race dialogue in education perpetuates** what the poet Aimé Césaire (2000) would call **a ‘pseudo-humanism’** (37) **that establishes white humanity at the expense of people of color**, reminding us that ‘the only way the European could make himself man was by fabricating slaves and monsters’ (Sartre 2004, lviii). In other words, it reaffirms an already hostile and unsafe environment for many students of color whose perspectives and experiences are consistently minimized. **It may be a euphemized form of violence**, a discursive ‘cool violence’ compared to the ‘hot violence’ of economic exploitation (McLaren, Leonardo, and Allen 1999), **but linguistic racism is no less a violation** (Derrida 1985**), maintains links between material distributions of power and a politics of recognition** (Fraser 1997), **and lowers stan- dards of humanity**. It **reaffirms Zˇ izˇek’s** (2008) **insight that violence is part of the fabric of the daily functioning of social life where systemic and symbolic violence passes as natural** (see Bourdieu and Passeron 1990; Bourdieu 1977). We suggest that a human- izing form of violence, a non-repressive expression of power, returns people to their rightful place, just as the violence of decolonization can potentially cancel the molest- ing power of colonialism.1 Safety discourses on race are a veiled form of violence and it will require a humanizing form of violence to expose contradictions in the discourse of ‘safety’. As a result, a new system of violence is introduced. We want to make it clear that we are not working from the hegemonic and literal appearance of violence and ask the reader to suspend naturalized images of violence as only bloodshed, physical, or repressive. **A humanizing form of violence is a pedagogy and politics of disruption** that shifts the regime of knowledge about what is ultimately possible as well as desirable as a racial arrangement. It is not violent in the usual and commonsensical sense of promoting war, injury, or coercion. Insofar as **the theory of violence we put forth is** positioned against racial domination, it is **violently anti-violence**. **To the extent that racial violence is structured in discourse, we argue that dislodging it will require a violent undertaking in order to set pedagogy on a humanizing trajectory**. For this we turn to Frantz Fanon’s insights – particularly the chapter concerning violence in The wretched of the earth. **Fanon’s work instructs us to consider the dialectics of violence: education as violent and violence as educative**. In public settings, people of color find themselves between the Scylla of becoming visible and the Charybdis of remaining silent. If minorities follow an analytics of color, they run the risk of incurring white symbolic racism at best or literal violence at worst. **Although some may argue that people of color maintain their dignity and counteract the culture of silence when they come to voice, participating in public race dialogue makes them vulnerable to assaults on many fronts**. On one level their actions illuminate what Fanon characterized as the tenuous relationship between humanity and reason. According to Gordon (1995), ‘If even reason or the understanding is infected with racism, where unreason stands on the opposite pole as a Manichaean abyss of black- ness, then a black man who reasons finds himself in the absurdity of the very construc- tion of himself as a black man who reasons...’ (8). On another level**, by sharing their real perspectives on race, minorities become overt targets of personal and academic threats**. It becomes a catch-22 for them. **Either they must observe the safety of whites and be denied a space that promotes people of color’s growth** and development **or insist on a space of integrity and put themselves further at risk** not only **of violence**, **but also risk being conceived of as illogical or irrational. Thus, white privilege is at the center of most race dialogues, even those that aim to critique and undo racial advantage**. Authentic participation for whites also has its contradictions but it is not marked by oppression. For people of color, race dialogue is more than ironic. A certain kind of violence that shifts the standards of humanity for people of color and whites is necessary if race dialogue is more than an exercise in safety but a search for liberatory possibilities. It is violent for whites and forces them to account for race in a condition of risk, not safety. If it is a safe condition, then it is the safety of being able to take risks, of putting oneself at risk, a condition many people of color already navigate, something Du Bois (1989) once described as ‘double consciousness’. It is also violent to people of color as it removes a previously violent regime from being ensconced and grafted onto their bodies. **We return to the neutral definition of violence, which is not inherently negative or positive but judged for its consequences**. At times, this requires performing violence against a primary violence, thereby making a truly peaceful coexistence possible: peace as a form of violence. Avoiding this violent shift allows an existing violence to continue, instituting a permanent state of discursive and ideological warfare. **The educative possibilities of violence are found precisely in this consideration**. Fanon was ultimately ambiguous about the role of violence in social change. When Fanon (2004) writes that decolonization ‘can only succeed by resorting to every means, including, of course, violence’, (3) we take him to mean violence in multiple ways, literal and physical violence only being one of them. For example, he declares: In the colonial context the colonist only quits undermining the colonized once the latter have proclaimed loud and clear that white values reign supreme. In the period of decol- onization the colonized masses thumb their noses at these very values, shower them with insults and vomit them up. (8) Colonialism’s violence is pervasive and Fanon suggests that an equally complete reversal, from physical to psychical violence, will be required to oppose it: ‘Violence among the colonized will spread in proportion to the violence exerted by the colonial regime’ (Fanon 2004, 46–7). Ejecting colonialism at the level of values and subjectiv- ity is as much a part of decolonization as material redistribution. As Wallerstein (2009) notes, ‘**Without violence the wretched of the earth can accomplish nothing.** But violence, however therapeutic and however effective, solves nothing’ (125). Although we clearly are appropriating Fanon’s insights for a context that differs from revolutionary Algeria and colonial Africa, we find his work useful for tackling modern problems with public race dialogues in education. Whether as a form of social analysis or support for policy, Fanon’s theory of violence is replete with insights on the racial contradictions of our time. First, we outline below the basic assumptions of Fanon’s theory of revolutionary, as opposed to repressive, violence. Second, we analyze the surrounding myths that an actual safe space exists for people of color when it concerns public race dialogue. Third, we critique the intellectualiza- tion of racism as part of the concrete violence lived by people of color in the acad- emy, which whites continually reduce to an idea. Here **we pedagogically reframe the racial predicament by promoting a ‘risk’ discourse about race, which does not assume safety but contradiction and tension**. This does not suggest that people of color are somehow correct by virtue of their social location. Finally, we consider the practical import of intellectual solidarity, where **understanding racism becomes the higher good** rather than whether or not one leaves the dialogue looking more or less racist than before. Two dominant discourses exist within debates concerning critical studies of race and education, one focusing on critical race theory (Gillborn 2008; Yosso 2006; Dixson and Rousseau 2005; Parker and Stovall 2005; Brayboy 2005; Bernal and Villalpando 2005; Ladson-Billings 2004; Taylor 1998; Solorzano 1998; Tate 1997; Ladson-Billings and Tate 1995) and the other a resurgent interest in the work of W.E.B. Du Bois (Alridge 1999, 2008; Provenzo 2002: Leonardo 2002). We support this development (Leonardo 2009). However, scant literature exists relating the work of Frantz Fanon to the study of education. This intervention is necessary considering the arguable relationship between education and colonialism, nationally and abroad (Macedo 2000; Ladson-Billings 1998; Altbach and Kelly 1978; Memmi 1965), as well as the recent turn to the decolonial imaginary in social theory (Maldonado-Torres 2006; Grosfoguel 2007; Wynter 1995) and the reassertion of a continuing coloniality in social life even after the fall of official administrative colonialism (Quijano 2000; Maldonado-Torres 2007). Gordon, Sharpley-Whiting, and White (1996) have argued that inquiries into Fanonian thought consist of five progressive stages, which include reactions to his work, biographies, analyses of his contribution to political theory, his role in the development of postcolonial theory, and finally his possible contribution to the gener- ation of original work across the human sciences. We seek to extend this fifth stage in Fanonian thought by applying his theory to the study of education. Fanon wrote at a time when the grim scenario of colonialism decreased through a moment of possibility when the process of decolonization could have led to the self- determined futures of the former colonies. Fanon (2004) recognized this critical moment and addressed the possibilities inherent in this political situation in his book, The wretched of the earth (see also, Fanon 1965, 1967a, 1967b). While Fanon’s focus may have been more internationalist in scope, the thin line that he posited to exist between the possibility of liberation and the risk of intensifying repressive violence, is significant for current discussions that seek to dismantle racism within the United States. We suggest that Fanon’s theorization of the process of decolonization, both in terms of the violence necessary for its existence and the violent activity required for its undoing, is applicable to a criticism of safe space dialogue concerning race. There is much to learn from Fanon’s argument that ‘decolonization is always a violent event’, be it at the level of the nation or the individual, because it requires ‘the substitution of one “species” of mankind by another’ (1). What follows is an explora- tion that seeks to clarify Fanon’s position regarding the violence of colonialism as applied to the study of race and education. The colonial situation of the 1950s and 1960s that Frantz Fanon writes of in The wretched of the earth presents us with an incredibly violent situation. According to Fanon, colonialism is a system that works, primarily by force, to permeate the entire lifeworld of the colonized. Those at the very bottom of the colonial hierarchy experi- ence the brunt of physical violence. Yet, **a form of educative-psychic violence in the form of racial discourses is also developed by the colonizer in order to keep the very consciousness of the colonized under control.** For instance, **the colonizer creates a narrative which posits that he is the creator of history, thus justifying conquest as well as racial and cultural supremacy**. The colonizer ‘makes history and he knows it’, according to Fanon, and ‘because he refers constantly to the history of his metropolis, he plainly indicates that [at the site of colonization] he is the extension of this metrop- olis’ (15). This form of psychic violence leads to abjection and feelings of inferiority on the part of the colonized (see also Fuss 1994). The colonized thus learn to stay in their place, and participate in a complex process of consent where they enact violence upon each other, are constantly anxious due to the violence they experience, and establish myths and religious systems that relegate their fate to the will of the gods (16–19). Sartre (2004) writes, ‘The status of “native” is a neurosis introduced and maintained by the colonist in the colonized with their consent’ (liv). Through this combination of physical and psychic violence, Fanon argues that the colonizer ‘brings violence into the homes and minds of the colonized subject’ (4). Fanon was clear that **education** – far from being neutral or enlightening in and of itself – **is at the core of colonial domination**. He emphasizes: In capitalist societies, education, whether secular or religious, the teaching of moral reflexes handed down from father to son, the exemplary integrity of workers decorated after fifty years of loyal and faithful service, the fostering of love for harmony and wisdom, those aesthetic forms of respect for the status quo, instill in the exploited a mood of submission and inhibition which considerably eases the task of the agents of law and order. (3–4; italics added) A hegemonic system of violence – one that necessitates a relationship of both active force and consent – functions so that the colonized either are forced into or acquiesce to their declared inferiority (Gramsci 1971; Hall 1996). This unraveling of physical and psychic violence would occur through the liberating violence of the colonized. In this sense, both domination and liberation are, in part, an educative question.2 For Fanon, violence is a necessary part of the process of decolonization due to the inherent brutality of the colonial situation. He argues firmly that the violence of colonialism can only be undone through the ‘cleansing force’ of violence (51). However, we must be clear what Fanon means when he uses the term ‘violence’ as well as his criticism of ‘nonviolence’. According to common sense, violence is defined as involving the exertion of force in order to injure, abuse, or destroy another human being. This kind of violence shifts downward our standards of humanity, a regime under which no human thrives. This is violence in both its negative and unciv- ilized senses, or the active and willful destruction of property and life, as opposed to a Fanonian conception of violence that is liberatory insofar as it frees humans from an oppressive regime by shifting upward the standards of humanity. The problem with the hegemonic definition of violence is that it acts as a regulatory power and renders violence as unacceptable on both sides of the colonial situation (Foucault 1990). As Angela Davis (1998) pointed out: The conservative, who does not dispute the validity of revolutions deeply buried in history, invokes visions of impending anarchy in order to legitimate his demand for absolute obedience. Law and order, with the major emphasis on order, is his watchword. The liberal articulates his sensitivity to certain of society’s intolerable details, but will almost never prescribe methods of resistance that exceed the limits of legality – redress through electoral channels is the liberal’s panacea. (39) This **limited understanding of violence is dangerous because it stifles any type of dialogue seeking to unpack the complexity of violence and its** multifarious **use in social movements**. However, non-violent tactics that have been praised include electoral politics, protests, the legal system, or dialogue where everyone is made to feel safe and included in the public sphere. The ultimate exemplars of the beneficial qualities of non-violence can be found in the personages of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. We will have more to say about Gandhi and King below. For now, we want to propose that both Fanon (internationally) and King (United States specifically) give us new understandings of the pitfalls and possibilities of violence, thereby transcending its traditional definition as simply repressive. Like King Jr., Fanon spoke of dreams (2004, 15) but Fanon’s projections were the natives’ liberation predicated on violence. [Continued 11 paragraphs later…] The myth of safety in race dialogue for people of color One of the main premises of safe-space discourse is that it provides a format for people of color and whites to come together and discuss issues of race in a matter that is not dangerous as well as inclusive. Thus, the **conventional guidelines used to estab- lish a safe space** – such as being mindful of how and when one is speaking, confiden- tiality, challenge by choice, and speaking from experience – are used to create an environment where fundamental issues can be broached and no one will be offended. Taken unproblematically, this trend is reasonable. However, **the ironic twist is that many individuals from marginalized groups become both offended and agitated when engaging in apparently safe spaces**.4 In their naiveté, many **white students and educators fail to appreciate the fact – a lived experience – that race dialogue is almost never safe for people of color** in mixed-racial company. But before we romanticize its oppo- site, or same-race dialogues, **the idea that homogeneous spaces are automatically safe for people of color is a mystification** for they result precisely **from a violent condition: racial segregation**. That said, something has gone incredibly wrong when students of color feel immobilized and marginalized within spaces and dialogues that are supposed to undo racism. This situation should give us doubt regarding whether or not safe-space dialogue really allows for the creativity necessary to promote a humanizing discussion on race, or if it functions, in Fanon’s words, as a negotiating table that seeks peaceful compromise without engaging in the violence necessary to both explore and undo racism. We want to suggest that **the reason why safe-space discussions partly break down in practice, if not at least in theory, is that they assume that, by virtue of formal and procedural guidelines, safety has been designated for both white people and people of color.** However, the term ‘safety’ acts as a misnomer because it often means that white individuals can be made to feel safe. Thus, a space of safety is circumvented, and instead a space of oppressive color-blindness is established. **It is a managed health-care version of anti-racism, an insurance against ‘looking racist’**. Fanon provides a useful counter to the inherent color-blindness of current racial pedagogy. Fanon’s arguments in both Black skin, white masks and The wretched of the earth, show sympathies with what intellectuals now call a post-racial analysis (see Leonardo in press). Fanon (1967a) warned against the inherent narcissism of white racial supe- riority found in arguments for separatism, what Appiah (1990) terms ‘extrinsic racism’, which is the inferiorization of an outer group in terms of their moral worth. Fanon stated, ‘I believe that the fact of the juxtaposition of the white and black races has created a massive psychoexistential complex. I hope by analyzing it to destroy it’ (12). In destroying the neuroses of blackness, Fanonian violence approaches post- race implications to the extent that the genesis of blackness is a source external to it: that is, whiteness (see Nayak 2006). By hoping to destroy it, Fanon suggests ending race as a neurotic relation. However, to be clear, Fanonian post-race differs from color-blindness because it seeks to destroy race and racism via a practice of full engagement as opposed to a practice of avoidance. Fanon’s methodology was phenomenological because he sought to undo racism by engaging the phenomenon itself, of going through race in order to undo it. Thus, a Fanonian post-racial gesture to pedagogy is both different and more beneficial than the color-blind stance taken up in safe-space dialogue, which is hardly blind to color. Perhaps **the problem with safe space is that it willingly tries to side step the issues, as well as the educative aspects of anger and frustration, necessary for a beneficial and truly liberatory dialogue** on race **to take place**. A Fanonian approach leads us back into considerations of violence in race-based dialogue. The question we must ask is how do we go about understanding liberatory discussions on race as necessitating violence? We are not speaking of violence in the sense of a willful act to injure or abuse, but a **violence** that **humanizes,** or shifts the standards of humanity **by providing space for the free expression of people’s thoughts and emotions that are not regulated by the discourse of safety**. Our main criticism of **safe space** is that it is laced with a narcissism that **designates safety for individuals in already dominant positions of power, which** is not safe at all but **perpetuates a system- atic relation of violence**. Fanon advised against a politics of narcissism, and instead advocated a materialist politics of recognition whereby an individual allows himself to be mediated by the other, or Fanon’s appropriation of Hegel’s (1977) idealism of the other. Unfortunately, this does not happen because **white narcissism is at the very center of safe space**. Through the avoidance of conflict and the emphasis on personal and image management, it maintains the self-image and understanding of whiteness and reveals a refusal to change through the other. To be fair, Fanon also took to task people of color’s own narcissism, particularly as it concerns the limitations of identity politics and nationalism, what Appiah (1990) calls ‘intrinsic racism’, or the assump- tion of a family resemblance within a group necessary in the short term and usually for protection against the assaults of an outer group.5 African nationalism during decolonization is an example of the second class, whereas Nazism represents the first class; both are problematic, but they differ in purpose and outcome. White indulgence is a gross attempt to understand the self through the self rather than through the other: narcissism par excellence. In fact, Fanon warns us that the ‘other’ in the self/other dichotomy in racial dialogue may not even exist. According to Gordon (2008): In the contemporary academy, **much discussion of race and racism is replete with criticism of otherness**. Fanon, however, argues that **racism proper eliminates such a relationship.** Instead of self and other, there are self, others, and non-self, non-others. In other words, **there is the category of people who are neither self nor others**. They are **no- one. The dialectics of recognition is disrupted, and the struggle of such people becomes one of achieving such a dialectics.** Put differently, they are not fighting against being others. They are **fighting to become others** and, in so doing, entering ethical relation- ships. This argument results in a peculiar critique of liberal political theory. Such theory presupposes ethical foundations of political life. What Fanon has shown is that political work needs to be done to make ethical life possible. That is because racism and colonial- ism derail ethical life. (italics added) **A pedagogical approach that avoids safety** in the interest of image and personal management **makes such an ethical relationship possible.** If we are truly interested in racial pedagogy, then we must become comfortable with the idea that for marginalized and oppressed minorities, **there is no safe space**. As implied above, mainstream race dialogue in education is arguably already hostile and unsafe for many students of color whose perspectives and experiences are consistently minimized. **Violence is already there**. In other words, like Fanon’s under- standing of colonialism, **safe space enacts violence. Those who are interested in engaging in racial pedagogy must** be prepared to (1) **undo the violence that is inherent to safe-space dialogue, and** (2) **enact a form of liberatory violence within race discus- sions to allow for a creativity that shifts the standards of humanity.** In other words, anger, hostility, frustration, and pain are characteristics that are not to be avoided under the banner of safety, which only produces Freire’s (1993) ‘culture of silence’. They are attributes that are to be recognized on the part of both whites and people of color in order to engage in a process that is creative enough to establish new forms of social existence, where both parties are transformed. This is not a form of violence that is life threatening and narcissistic, but one that is life affirming through its ability to promote mutual recognition. Pedagogy of fear and the intellectualization of race **Teaching race literacy is necessary** but difficult. In addition, authentic race dialogue is elusive because over and beyond its emotional register for many educators and students, race dialogue runs into the formidable force of ideology. In mixed racial company, **race dialogue is almost never for the benefit of people of color and race- conscious whites**. In fact, as Nishitani Osamu (2006) observes, race dialogue in mixed-race company works to maintain the Western distinction between ‘anthropos’ (the inhuman) and ‘humanitas’ (the human). Osamu points out, ‘“anthropos” cannot escape the status of being the object of anthropological knowledge, while “humanitas” is never defined from without but rather expresses itself as the subject of all knowl- edge’ (260). Put another way, **race dialogue often maintains the status of whiteness as being both natural and unchanging** in the white imaginary. In other words, **whiteness remains ubiquitous even if it is not named**, and noticing whiteness is itself regarded as a form of transgression (hooks 1992). **Whiteness is the immovable mover, unmarked marker, and unspoken speaker.** Although it would be interesting to focus on race discussions within a homoge- neous group, or same-race dialogues, the imagined situation we put forth is a mixed company because it projects the ideal of public integration and the educational challenges to it. Given that integration is the goal, many **students of color who seek ‘safe’ race discussions in public rarely find them, having to settle for the reality that most pedagogical situations involving race are violent to them.** **They realize quite quickly that public race talk is not for them but for** whites, or at least **a white mindset**. In other words, it caters to a white racial frame, a white imaginary (Leonardo 2009), which is a collective unconscious that tolerates race dialogue in small amounts. Often, as Fanon’s (1967a) critique of Sartre (1948) indicates, **whites turn racism into an intellectualist problem, rather than a lived one** (132–5).4 Following a Fanonian dialectic, at root **racism is a material problem**, which suggests displacing an idealist framework with a concrete one. **Public race discussions are examples of white racial hegemony insofar as they represent whites’ accommodation** to demands of color as long as white common sense is observed and kept intact. As a result, most race discussions benefit whites and patronize people of color; they project a white audience, both real and imagined. In this interaction, the otherwise deep and intimate understanding that people of color have to offer is forsaken in exchange for an epiphenomenal, intellec- tualist interpretation of race. There are genuine fears that must be confronted when educators publicly discuss race in the classroom. Both whites and people of color face certain dangers that prevent an authentic exchange. Not only do whites fear that they will be exposed as racist; they also fear being found out as racial beings. People of color already know that whites comprise a racial group, therefore white raciality would not represent a shocking discovery for them. However, whites’ discovery of their own raciality is precisely what is at stake. Hiding behind the veil of color-blindness means that lifting it would force whites to confront their self-image, with people of color acting as the mirror. This act is not frightening for people of color but for whites. In the light of day, this fact of whiteness would have led Fanon to declare, ‘Look a white person!’ Although this pale façade is becoming more difficult to sustain, whites cultivate a color-blind mask that even Fanon would not have predicted. To be clear, color-blind- ness in a color-obsessed nation appears oxymoronic and whites would have to work hard to maintain the mask. In a race-saturated society, such as the United States, color- blind racism is accurately described as a mode of feigning an oblivion to race. In short, color-blind perspectives are attempts to observe – indeed to see – race in a way that maintains whites’ equilibrium. It is not literally a form of blindness but its precise opposite: seeing race in a selective way that makes whites acceptable, not to people of color per se, but to themselves. It would be a mistake to regard color-blindness as a non-racial move and more accurate to construct it as a particular deployment of race. **Authentic race discussions are violent to whites for the very reason that such discussions would expose their investment in race,** their full endorsement of, rather than, flippant regard for it. It speaks to the inauthentic education that whites experi- ence. This does not suggest that their fear has no basis. In fact, it has a material basis for it represents one of the many walls that people of color have to scale as they attempt to convince whites that race matters in a manner different from whites’ under- standing of it. Some whites who are open minded enough, often feel enlightened and enlivened by discussions that confront racism, vowing their commitment to the cause. That established, whites often conceive of race talks as intellectually stimulating – as in a discovery or another topic in which they can excel – rather than a lived experience that students of color in good faith share with their white colleagues. Meanwhile, students of color walk away from the same discussions barely advancing their under- standing of race and racism, sometimes satisfied departing with their legitimacy and mindset intact. After all, these confrontations were not for their benefit; they were not meant to advance people of color. **A Fanon-inspired race dialogue is not anti- intellectual, but precisely anti-intellectualist. Said another way, it is materialist.** Minority fears are quite different from white apprehensions concerning public race talk. Despite the countless occasions where people of color expose their intimate thoughts and hurts about racism, then followed by white dismissal (not always overt), their desire for authentic race dialogue represents their hope not only in themselves but a hope projected onto whites. It is, on one hand, naïve and a sign of wishful think- ing on the part of minorities to expect more out of whites than whites expect out of themselves. On the other hand, it is a humanizing desire and commitment to the other that prevents people of color from disengaging from whites. People of color may suspend their memory of white aggressions in order to start anew, of renewing their hope that this time it will be different. Then they are reminded of the pattern they know so well and their disappointment haunts them. They may even strike back against empire and voice their disapprobation at whites. Too often, whites interpret minority anger as a distancing move, or the confirmation of the ‘angry’ person of color arche- type, rather than its opposite: an attempt to engage the other, to be vulnerable to the other, to be recognized by the other, to be the other for the other. As Freire (1993) once remarked, protestation from the oppressed is an act of love insofar as it represents an act of engagement. When the oppressed open their wounds through communication, they express the violence in their dehumanization that they want the oppressor to recognize. **People of color do not only fear overt violence from whites** (although this would be enough**) but rather** their wantonness, **their lack of recognition** of people of color, a certain violence of the heart rather than the fist. This is what Fanon (2004) describes as ‘**violence rippling under the skin’** (31). This second- ary form of violence **confirms a daily assault that often goes unnoticed**. It is a double violence that fails to acknowledge the other on whom one imposes an unwelcome will. It may sound like a slave’s maneuver to desire recognition from the master but such is the relationship of bondage within a colonial relationship. It would be enough to suggest that people of color fear overt white violence in the form of physical aggres- sion. People of color have other fundamental fears in becoming invisible to whites, of becoming merely an idea to them. Some minority students willingly participate in otherwise problematic race conversations because they refuse to surrender to absolute cynicism, where racism would have succeeded. They realize that participation maintains their sense of humanity and disengagement subverts the kind of person they want to cultivate, the kind of self or student they want to be. In other words, **disengagement is one of the symptoms of structural racism**, which succeeds at isolating us from one another, of subverting our ability to live through the other. Still some people of color give into despair, tired as they are of educating whites from ground zero ... every time, again and again. Who can blame them? It is a survival mechanism that people of color have practiced over the years in order to prevent their anger and frustration from consuming them, of turn- ing to self-destructive forms of violence in the form of rage. Or, it is a defense against white violence – in the form of microaggressions – which strikes at the academic legitimacy of scholars and students of color when they violate the color-blind codes of conduct that regulate the classroom. People of color sometimes overlook white violence so they can get through their daily life. Like a child who has been abused, people of color avoid white violence by strategically playing along, a practice that whites, whose racial development stunts their growth, underestimate when they mistake consensus as the absence of coercion. Like abused children who do not possess the ability to consent and defend themselves against the verbal and physical power of a parent, people of color have become masters at deflection. This is how they secure safety in violent circumstances. **It is apparent that both whites and people of color want to avoid violence from being enacted against them. They enter race dialogue from radically different locations – intellectual for the former, lived for the latter** – and an unevenness that the critical race pedagogue must accept and becomes the constitutive condition of any progressive dialogue on race. It is the risk that comes with violence but one worth taking if educators plan to shift the standards of humanity. In an apparently common quest for mutual racial understanding, whites and people of color participate in a violence that becomes an integral part of the process and seeking a ‘safe space’ is itself a form of violence insofar as it fails to recognize the myth of such geography in interracial exchange. As it concerns people of color within the current regime, **safe space** in racial dialogue **is a projection rather than a reality**. This is the myth that majoritarian stories in education replay and retell in order to perpetuate an understanding of race that **maintains white supremacy. Safe spaces are violent to people of color and only by enacting a different form of violence, of shifting the discourse**, will race dialogue ultimately become a space of mutual recognition between whites and people of color. **If people of color observe the current call for safety, this process defaults to white understandings and comfort zones, which have a well-documented history of violence against people of color**. It is a point of entry that is characterized by denials, evasions, and falsehoods (Frankenberg 1993; Mills 1997). Its shell is non-violent for in public most whites prize self-control. **Race dialogue within a white framework is rational**, if by that we mean a situation **that preserves**, as Angela Davis (1998) mentioned, **peace and order.** **This procedural arrangement has much to recommend it if we want to avoid** uprisings and outright **violence. But its kernel is already violent to people of color** because a certain irrational rationality is at work. Both parties leave the interaction relatively ‘intact’, which should not be equated with the absence of violence. **Whites depart the situation with their worldview and value systems unchallenged and affirmed, and people of color remain fractured in theirs. Whites would need to experience violence if they expect to change**. But this is different from a hegemonic understanding that violence is always a form of dehumanization. In our appropriation of Fanon’s dialectics of violence, **we find transformative possibilities in violence depending on the political project** to which it is attached. Moreover, in this framework violence is not so much a description of this or that act qualifying as a form of violence, but **a theoretical prescription of a different state of affairs, a response to oppression that equals its intensity**. Thus, we do not describe what violence looks like, but assess its consequences.

### Otherness

#### And prefer my Role of the ballot, it paves the way for critical inquiry and practices the inclusion of every other.

Powell and Shaffer 09’ (Benjamin D, Tracy S.) “On the Haunting of Performance Studies” Liminalities: A Journal of Performance Studies Vol. 5, No. 1, April 2009

Conversely, analyzing experience in terms of the ghost (being hospitable to the other), multiplies the possibilities for articulating experiences. Put another way, the relationship and/or tension between performance practice and theory is a process of perpetual production viewed through the lens of haunting. Rather than understanding performance as a discrete object that disappears, as Peggy Phelan advocates in her book Unmarked: The Politics of Performance, haunting imagines performance as never disappearing but continually producing systems, sites, and modes of critical inquiry. Rather than writing toward disappearance, as Phelan advocates, we write toward production, utilizing and extending upon the theoretical discourses offered by contemporary performance scholars and practitioners.

# AT’s

## Permutation

## AT Policymaking

### Haunt>Policy

#### Justice towards the other is the only non-deconstructable impact. Justice is the foremost concern for the policymaker, to pay respect to the otherness of the haunted Other.

McQuillan 08 (Martin McQuillan, “Derrida and Policy: Is Deconstruction Really a Social Science?” Derrida Today, 2009, //DOA 9/8/16 GK)

Again to be for Justice is to be in favour of breathing and given the way that this term is routinely abused and appropriated it is no doubt necessary to take care around this word. However, Derrida is moved to tell us that 'justice is the undeconstructable condition of any deconstruction' (Derrida 1994, 28). This is a syntagm with which I have wrestled for some time, given that any metaphysical concept can in principle be deconstructed and that 'justice' is surely a metaphysical concept politically and philosophically inscribed. To be too hasty in my commentary, the notion of justice that Derrida is invoking here is of course catachrestic and quasi-transcendental, whereby the idea of 'justice' refers to the act of deconstruction which does justice to the otherness of the event by enabling that otherness to speak, the undeconstructable (irreducible) condition of any deconstruction would be to articulate such otherness. The present importance of this is that in doing justice to policy one must take account of the difficulty of what is referred to by Derrida by the twin names of the 'undecideablity' and 'responsibility' of such an event. One the one hand, the policy maker should take account of the injustice of his/her own policy formation, which as a textual inscription, will inevitably fail to do justice to the possibilities of otherness within itself and will simultaneously and constantly be in the process of disarticulating itself from within as a consequence of this otherness, rendering itself unstable and radically undecideable. Taking account of this scenario will require the self-aware policy maker to act responsibly with respect to the task of policy making by taking time to reflect judiciously on the event of alterity (which will be forever undecideable) and at the same time acting responsibly with the respect to the other by doing justice to that other and acting quickly (or formulating policy quickly) which will respond to the immediate urgency in the here and now of the needs of the other. This is to say, once again that policy, properly understood, is beginning to look more and more like an untenable prospect from a "deconstructive" point of view. Some would say that it would be entirely typical of 'the Derrida Party' to have a policy of having no policies. However, this would be a crude reduction. I think the more considerable difficulty here is that it may not be possible for deconstruction ever to produce an inaugural or generative political discourse outside of an act of reading or critical intervention. From the point of view of a faithfulness to a certain manner of reading the world, there could be no political discourse worthy of the name of deconstruction which was generated outside of or anterior to a singular act of 'reading' a unique event. This is not to say that deconstruction would be for ever condemned to read and reread the texts of the political canon as a route to articulating the alterity repressed within them by the logocentric model of western political discourse (as if this were merely or simply a secondary, supplementary or weaker task than, say, policy making). Rather, with the reading (as critical intervention) of singular events comes the requirement to affirm a position with respect to that event and in so doing negotiate between that necessarily material and institutional position (counter-institutions are also institutions) and the risk to that position incurred by the affirmation of the unpredictable effects of otherness. Every policy then needs to be open to the risk of its own deconstruction by the very political conditions it puts in play. It is of course not the role of deconstruction to offer reassuring and easily appropriable policies to policy-makers. However, risk and policy are uneasy companions; we live in an age of 'risk management', in which policies are formulated to predict the unpredictable consequences of risk. Risk can be neutralised by techne, such is the dream of the death cult of contemporary managerialism.

### Epistemology DA

#### Epistemology DA – Western representations of the world normalize colonial practices. A critical examination of state politics creates a starting point to challenge homogenous ways of thinking.

Trofanenko 05 (Brenda Trofanenko, 2005, “On Defense of the Nation”—Toward a More Global Sense of the Nation, 96:5, <http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/10.3200/TSSS.96.5.193-198>, p 197 Trofanenko is a professor in the Department of Curriculum and Instruction at the University of Illinois, Urbana Champaign. // DOA 9/8/16 GK)

Knowing how history is a site of political struggle, how we engage with social studies education means emphasizing how power, processes, and practices bear tangible effects on forging a national (and common) history by reproducing and vindicating inclusions and exclusions. Such a critique requires questioning how a singular, fixed, and static history celebrates the U.S. nation and its place in the world as that "common base of factual information about the American historical and contemporary experience" (27) argues for in the Fordham report. Our world history courses are central to defining, understanding, and knowing not only other nations but also the position of each nation in relation to the United States. The centrality that the west holds (notably the United States as an imperial power) is ingrained and willful in framing specific representations of the west that normalize the imperial practices that established this nation. The role that the United States holds on the world stage frequently remains unquestioned in social studies classrooms. Certainly, we engage with various images and tropes to continue to advance how the colonialist past continues to remain present in our historical sensibilities. Moreover, the increasing number and choices of archival sources function as a complement to further understanding the nation. If students are left to rely on the variety of historical resources rather than question the use of such resources, then the most likely outcome of their learning will be the reflection on the past with nostalgia that continues to celebrate myths and colonial sensibility. To evaluate the history narrative now is to reconsider what it means and to develop a historical consciousness in our students that goes beyond archival and nostalgic impulses associated with the formation of the nation and U.S. nation building. We need to insist that the nation, and the past that has contributed to its present day understanding, is simultaneously material and symbolic. The nation as advanced in our histories cannot be taken as the foundational grounds. The means by which the nation is fashioned calls for examining the history through which nations are made and unmade. To admit the participatory nature of knowledge and to invite an active and critical engagement with the world so that students can come to question the authority of historical texts will, I hope, result in students' realizing that the classroom is not solely a place to learn about the nation and being a national, but rather a place to develop a common understanding of how a nation is often formed through sameness. We need to continue to question how a particular national history is necessary as an educational function, but especially how that element has been, and remains, useful at specific times. My hope is to extend the current critique of history within social studies, to move toward understanding why history and nation still needs a place in social studies education. In understanding how the historicity of nation serves as "the ideological alibi of the territorial state" (Appadurai 1996, 159) offers us a starting point. The challenge facing social studies educators is how we can succeed in questioning nation, not by displacing it from center stage but by considering how it is central. That means understanding how powerfully engrained the history of a nation is within education and how a significant amount of learning is centered around the nation and its history. History is a forum for assessing and understanding the study of change over time, which shapes the possibilities of knowledge itself. We need to reconsider the mechanisms used in our own teaching, which need to be more than considering history as a nostalgic reminiscence of the time when the nation was formed. We need to be questioning the contexts for learning that can no longer be normalized through history's constituted purpose. The changing political and social contexts of public history have brought new opportunities for educators to work through the tensions facing social studies education and its educational value to teachers and students. Increasing concerns with issues of racism, equality, and the plurality of identities and histories mean that there is no unified knowledge as the result of history, only contested subjects whose multilayered and often contradictory voices and experiences intermingle with partial histories that are presented as unified. This does not represent a problem, but rather an opportunity for genuine productive study, discussion, and learning.

### Policy=conditions

#### Any condition imposed onto accepting the Other lends itself to a politics of tolerance and scrutinized hospitality. Unconditional acceptance of the other is a precondition to any ethics and politics.

Borradori ‘3 (Giovanna Borradori, professor of philosophy at Vassar college, Interview with Jacques Derrida “Philosophy in a Time of Terror” pg. 158-159)

The history of the concept reveals that tolerance “is always on the side of the ‘reason of the strongest,”’ firmly tied to the figure of the sov­ereign that Habermas also mentions in our dialogue. From this point of view, being tolerant is not going to make those who feel excluded any more included or understood. This was certainly a blunt statement to make in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, when Western countries were relying on tolerance as their unifying moral commit­ment. While in Derrida’s mind there is no way to overcome the one-sid­edness of tolerance, hospitality is a much more flexible concept. “If I think I am being hospitable because I am tolerant, it is because I wish to limit my welcome, to retain power and maintain control over the lim­its of my ‘home,’ my sovereignty, my ‘I can’ (my territory, my house, my language, my culture, my religion, and so on).” Tolerance is “a scruti­nized hospitality, always under surveillance, parsimonious and protec­tive of its sovereignty. In the best of cases, it’s what I would call a con­ditional hospitality, the one that is most commonly practiced by indi­viduals, families, cities, or states.”34 The advantage of hospitality over tolerance is that it lends itself, as forgiveness does, to being posited in the double register of the condi­tional and the unconditional. In fact, tolerance is, for Derrida, condi­tional hospitality. By being tolerant one admits the other under one’s own conditions, and thus under one’s authority, law, and sovereignty. Derrida hopes instead for a new conception of hospitality that is, in a sense, much more tolerant than tolerance. Surprisingly for those who believe that Derrida is a counter-Enlightenment thinker, Kant is his point of reference. Derrida’s articulation of unconditional hospitality hinges on Kant’s distinction between two kinds of rights: right of invi­tation and right of visitation. But pure or unconditional hospitality does not consist in such an invita­tion (“I invite you, I welcome you into my home, on the condition that you adapt to the laws and norms of my territory, according to my lan­guage, tradition, memory, and so on”). Pure and unconditional hospital­ity, hospitality itself, opens or is in advance open to someone who is nei­ther expected nor invited, to whomever arrives as an absolutely foreign visitor, as a new arrival, nonidentifiable and unforeseeable, in short, wholly other. I would call this a hospitality of visitation rather than invi­tation. The visit might actually be very dangerous, and we must not ig­nore this fact, but would a hospitality without risk, a hospitality backed by certain assurances, a hospitality protected by an immune system against the wholly other, be true hospitality? As no sense of forgiveness would exist without unconditional forgive­ness, no sense of true hospitality and openness to the other would exist without unconditional hospitality.

### Policy=fucked

#### Legal discourse about Native populations can never escape the web of coloniality

Gehres 01 (Edward D. Gehres III\*, “Visions of the Ghost Dance: Native American Empowerment and the Neo-Colonial Impulse,” Hein Online, 2001, Online, Accessed 8/20/16, Pages 163. \*Associate, Arnold and Porter, Washington, D.C.; J.D., 2001, University of Virginia School of Law; MA., 1996, The Graduate School of Political Management at The George Washington University; A.B., 1994, University of Michigan.)

The application of these constructs of European derived legal discourse to the issue of a congressional waiver of tribal sovereign immunity reveals that despite intermittent advances in policy that have strengthened tribal sovereignty, the vestiges of **colonial legal reasoning still hold strong influence in American legal thought.** What has emerged with the instantaneous congressional and judicial reactions to the public backlash surrounding the empowerment of a few Indian nations is the "neo-colonial impulse" in policymaking. The reapplication of backward looking colonial images of Indian nations and culture, combined with the fundamental misconception that Indian nations should not participate in the policymaking surrounding their own sovereign powers of government, has produced a situation that could pose significant threats to the stability of enterprise development efforts by subjecting tribal governments to coercive and frivolous lawsuits from states and citizens seeking redress from the supposedly "unfair" advantages possessed by Indian nations. Tribal governments readily acknowledge that creative solutions must be sought to establish limited waivers and disclosure requirements concerning a tribe's sovereign immunity so that entities dealing with Indian nations will have proper protections and fair notice. Tribal governments need to decide for themselves how much sovereign immunity they must cede and under which circumstances this should be done. The proper scope of their waiver and disclosure requirements ought to reflect the input of their bilateral partners in government and enterprise development, but the ultimate decision over these inherent sovereign powers ought to rest with those possessing them. The perceptions fueled by the misunderstanding of recent economic development success and the fear and anger that have arisen as a result of new Indian empowerment must cede to the creation of new theories for the future of federal-Indian relations.

### Spivak

#### Permutation do both – The friction between the 1AC and 1NC methodologies are able to induce new tropes of political reality via deconstructive juxtaposition.

Spivak ‘97 [an Indian theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, where she is a founding member of the school's Institute for Comparative Literature and Society, “Jacques Derrida OF GRAMMATOLOGY” Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,” <http://www.mohamedrabeea.com/books/book1_3997.pdf>]

Speaking of the hymen, Derrida emphasizes the role of the blank spaces of the page in the play of meaning. Analogically, Derrida himself often devotes his attention to the text in its margins, so to speak. He examines the minute particulars of an undecidable moment, nearly imperceptible displacements, that might otherwise escape the reader’s eye. Reading Foucault, he concentrates on three pages out of 673. Reading Rousseau, he chooses a text that is far from “central.” Reading Heidegger, he proceeds to write a note on a note to Sein and Zeit. His method, as he says to Jean-Louis Houdebine, perhaps a little too formulaically, is reversal and displacement. It is not enough “simply to neutralize the binary oppositions of metaphysics.” We must recognize that, within the familiar philosophical oppositions, there is always “a violent ((lxxvii)) hierarchy. One of the two terms controls the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), holds the superior position. To deconstruct the opposition is first .. . to overthrow [renverser] the hierarchy.” (Pos F 57, Pos E. I. 36) To fight violence with violence. In the Grammatology this structural phase would be represented by all those pages where, all apologies to the contrary, the polemical energy seems clearly engaged in putting writing above speech. But in the next phase of deconstruction, this reversal must be displaced, the winning term put under erasure. The critic must make room for “the irruptive emergence of a new ‘concept,’ a concept which no longer allows itself to be understood in terms of the previous regime [system of oppositions].” In terms of our book, this would be the aspect that “allows for the dissonant emergence of a writing inside of speech, thus disorganizing all the received order and invading the whole sphere of speech” (Pos E I. 36). To locate the promising marginal text, to disclose the undecidable moment, to pry it loose with the positive lever of the signifier; to reverse the resident hierarchy, only to displace it; to dismantle in order to reconstitute what is always already inscribed. Deconstruction in a nutshell. But take away the assurance of the text’s authority, the critic’s control, and the primacy of meaning, and the possession of this formula does not guarantee much. Why should we undo and redo a text at all? Why not assume that words and the author “mean what they say?” It is a complex question. Here let us examine Derrida’s most recent meditation upon the desire of deconstruction. Derrida acknowledges that the desire of deconstruction may itself be-come a desire to reappropriate the text actively through mastery, to show the text what it “does not know.” And as she deconstructs, all protestations to the contrary, the critic necessarily assumes that she at least, and for the time being, means what she says. Even the declaration of her vulnerability must come, after all, in the controlling language of demonstration and reference. In other words, the critic provisionally forgets that her own text is necessarily self-deconstructed, always already a palimpsest. The desire of deconstruction has also the opposite allure. Deconstruction seems to offer a way out of the closure of knowledge. By inaugurating the open-ended indefiniteness of textuality —by thus “placing in the abyss” (mettre en abîme), as the French expression would literally have it—it shows us the lure of the abyss as freedom. The fall into the abyss of deconstruction inspires us with as much pleasure as fear. We are intoxicated with the prospect of never hitting bottom.Thus a further deconstruction deconstructs deconstruction, both as the search for a foundation (the critic behaving as if she means what she says in her text), and as the pleasure of the bottomless. The tool for this, as ((lxxviii)) indeed for any deconstruction, is our desire, itself a deconstructive and grammatological structure that forever differs from (we only desire what is not ourselves) and defers (desire is never fulfilled) the text of our selves. Deconstruction can therefore never be a positive science. For we are in a bind, in a “double (read abyssal) bind,” Derrida’s newest nickname for the schizophrenia of the “sous rature.” 81 We must do a thing and its opposite, and indeed we desire to do both, and so on indefinitely. Deconstruction is a perpetually self-deconstructing movement that is inhabited by differance. No text is ever fully deconstructing or deconstructed. Yet the critic provisionally musters the metaphysical resources of criticism and performs what declares itself to be one (unitary) act of deconstruction. As I point out on pages Ixxxi–lxxxii, the kinship with Freud’s interminable and terminable analysis, involving both subject and analyst, is here not to be ignored.

## DA General

### AT Nuke War

#### Nuclear war is a text – its reference is what makes it a threat.

Derrida ’84 (Jacques Derrida; Catherine Porter; Philip Lewis, “No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives)” Diacritics, Vol. 14, No. 2, Nuclear Criticism. (Summer, 1984), pp. 20-31)

Third reason. In our techno-scientitico-mifitaro-diplomatic incompetence, we may con-sider ourselves, however, as competent as others to deal with a phenomenon whose essen-tial feature is that of being fabulously textual, through and through. Nuclear weaponry depends, more than any weaponry in the past, it seems, upon structures of information and communication, structures of language, Including non-vocalizable language, structures of codes and graphic decoding. But the phenomenon is fabulously textual also to the extent that, for the moment, a nuclear war has not taken place: one can only talk and write about it. You will say, perhaps: but it is not the first time; the other wars, too, so long as they hadn't taken place, were only talked about and written about. And as to the fright of imaginary anticipation, what might prove that a European in the period following the war of 1870 might not have been more terrified by the "technological" image of the bombings and exterminations of the Second World War (even supposing he had been able to form such an image) than we are by the image we can construct for ourselves of a nuclear war? The logic of this argument is not devoid of value, especially if one is thinking about a limited and "clean" nuclear war. But it loses its value in the face of the hypothesis of a total nuclear war, which, as a hypothesis, or, if you prefer, as a fantasy, or phantasm, conditions every discourse and all strategies. Unlike the other wars, which have all been preceded by wars of more or less the same type in human memory (and gunpowder did not mark a radical break in this respect), nuclear war has no precedent. It has never occurred, itself; it is a non-event. The explosion of American bombs in 1945 ended a "classical," conventional war; it did not set off a nuclear war. The terrifying reality of the nuclear conflict can only be the signified referent, never the real referent (present or past) of a discourse or a text. At least today apparently. And that sets us to thinking about today, our day, the presence of this present in and through that fabulous textuality. Better than ever and more than ever. The growing multiplication of the discourse— indeed, of the literature — on this subject may constitute a process of fearful domestication, the anticipatory assimilation of that unanticipatable entirely-other. For the moment, today, one may say that a non-localizable nuclear war has not occurred; it has exis-tence only through what is said of it, only where it is talked about. Some might call it a fable, then, a pure invention: in the sense in which it is said that a myth, an image, a fiction, a utopia, a rhetorical figure, a fantasy, a phantasm, are inventions. It may also be called a speculation, even a fabulous specularization. The breaking of the mirror would be, finally, through an act of language, the very occurrence of nuclear war. Who can swear that our unconscious is not expecting this? dreaming of it, desiring it? You will perhaps find it shock-ing to find the nuclear issue reduced to a fable. But then I haven't said simply that. I have recalled that a nuclear war is for the time being a fable, that is, something one can only talk about But who can fail to recognize the massive "reality “ of nuclear weaponry and of the ter- rifying forces of destruction that are being stockpiled and capitalized everywhere, that are corning to constitute the very movement of capitalization. One has to distinguish between this "reality" of the nuclear age and the fiction of war. But, and this would perhaps be the imperative of a nuclear criticism, one must also be careful to interpret critically this critical or diacritical distinction. For the "reality" of the nuclear age and the fable of nuclear war are perhaps distinct, but they are not two separate things. It is the war (in other words the (able) that triggers this fabulous war effort, this senseless capitalization of sophisticated weaponry, this speed race in search of speed, this crazy precipitation which, through techno-science, through al the techno-scientific inventiveness that it motivates, structures not only the army, diplomacy, politics, but the whole of the human socius today, everything that is named by the old words culture, civilization, aihriung, schofe, pandeia. "Reality," let's say the encom-passing institution of the nuclear age, is constructed by the fable, on the basis of an event that has never happened (except in fantasy, and that is not nothing at alp, an event of which one can only speak, an event whose advent remains an invention by men (in all the senses of the word "invention") or which, rather, remains to be invented. An invention because it depends upon new technical mechanisms, to be sure, but an invention also because it does not exist and especially because, at whatever point it should come into existence, it would be a grand premiere appearance. Fourth reason. Since we are speaking of fables, of language, of fiction and fantasy, writing and rhetoric, let us go even further. Nuclear war does not depend on language just because we can do nothing but speak of it — and then as something that has never occurred. It does not depend on language just because the "incompetents" on all sides can speak of it only in the mode of gossip or of doxa (opinion) — and the dividing line between doxa and episteme starts to blur as soon as there is no longer any such thing as an absolutely legitimizable competence for a phenomenon which is no longer strictly techno-scientific but techno-miktaro-politico-diplomatic through and through, and which brings into play the doxa or incompetence even in its calculations. There is nothing but doxa, opinion, "belief." One can no longer oppose belief and science, doxa and episteme, once one has reached the decisive place at the nuclear age, in other words, once one has arrived at the critical place of the nuclear age. In this critical place, there is no more room for a distinction between belief and science, thus no more space for a "nuclear criticism" strictly speaking. Nor even for a truth in that sense. No truth, no apocalypse. (As you know. Apocalypse means Revelation, of Truth, Un-veiling.) No, nuclear war is not only fabulous because one can only talk about it, but because the extraordinary sophistication of its technologies—which are also the technologies of delivery, sending, dispatching, of the missile in general, of mission, missive, emission, and transmission, like all techne — the extraordinary sophistication of these technologies coexists, cooperates in an essential way with sophistry, psycho-rhetoric, and the most cursory, the most archaic, the most crudely opinionated psychagogy, the most vulgar psychology. We can therefore consider ourselves competent because the sophistication of the nuclear strategy can never do without a sophistry of belief and the rhetorical simulation of a text.

## A2 ‘Give back the land’

#### The USFG giving back the land just masks the problem – this is terminal defense to their argument. Just giving back the land not only creates a savior pathology with the white man /sympathetically/ giving back the land which turns their solvency but also masks the problem of indigenous sovereignty that is made up of more than arbitrary border lines & ownership distinctions

#### 2) Legal discourse about Native populations can never escape the web of coloniality

Gehres 01 (Edward D. Gehres III\*, “Visions of the Ghost Dance: Native American Empowerment and the Neo-Colonial Impulse,” Hein Online, 2001, Online, Accessed 8/20/16, Pages 163. \*Associate, Arnold and Porter, Washington, D.C.; J.D., 2001, University of Virginia School of Law; MA., 1996, The Graduate School of Political Management at The George Washington University; A.B., 1994, University of Michigan.)

The application of these constructs of European derived legal discourse to the issue of a congressional waiver of tribal sovereign immunity reveals that despite intermittent advances in policy that have strengthened tribal sovereignty, the vestiges of **colonial legal reasoning still hold strong influence in American legal thought.** What has emerged with the instantaneous congressional and judicial reactions to the public backlash surrounding the empowerment of a few Indian nations is the "neo-colonial impulse" in policymaking. The reapplication of backward looking colonial images of Indian nations and culture, combined with the fundamental misconception that Indian nations should not participate in the policymaking surrounding their own sovereign powers of government, has produced a situation that could pose significant threats to the stability of enterprise development efforts by subjecting tribal governments to coercive and frivolous lawsuits from states and citizens seeking redress from the supposedly "unfair" advantages possessed by Indian nations. Tribal governments readily acknowledge that creative solutions must be sought to establish limited waivers and disclosure requirements concerning a tribe's sovereign immunity so that entities dealing with Indian nations will have proper protections and fair notice. Tribal governments need to decide for themselves how much sovereign immunity they must cede and under which circumstances this should be done. The proper scope of their waiver and disclosure requirements ought to reflect the input of their bilateral partners in government and enterprise development, but the ultimate decision over these inherent sovereign powers ought to rest with those possessing them. The perceptions fueled by the misunderstanding of recent economic development success and the fear and anger that have arisen as a result of new Indian empowerment must cede to the creation of new theories for the future of federal-Indian relations.

#### 3) Giving the land back is literally impossible

Rhoan 11 Erick Rhoan Uh-tourney Attorney at law. Feb 27, 2011 [San Joaquin College of Law](https://www.quora.com/topic/San-Joaquin-College-of-Law) https://www.quora.com/profile/Erick-Rhoan//KAE

The United States government holds title to all Indian land. However, because Indian nations were pre-existing sovereign entities prior to the United States' existence, the US agreed to provide for their general welfare. With this in mind, the US holds title to the land; however, places it into trust for the benefit of the Indians that live on it. This is the concept of federal trust land. When Indian tribes are recognized by the United States government (such as when they organize and wish to build a casino), certain amount of land is taken into trust for them by the United States. If you read the US Supreme Court opinion, Johnson v. M'Intosh ([http://www.utulsa.edu/law/classe...](http://www.utulsa.edu/law/classes/rice/USSCT_Cases/JOHNSON_V_MCINTOSH_1823.HTM)), the Court explains that the United States gained complete title to all Indian land within the United States via the Discovery Doctrine. This doctrine essentially holds that whichever Western power got to the "unoccupied" land first could claim possession of it. Thus, Indian land is really the United States' land, the Indians just derive a right to occupy it, but not a right to control it. Therefore, the Indians have no legal claim to get their land back. Like Paul said, Congress will never cede federally held land back to any sovereign power.

## narrative bad theory

## reps of suffering

# Extensions/Add-ons

#### RETAG First the land was colonized, then it was segregated and pillaged into reservations, now the land exists as a hostile dumping ground for nuclear waste. Every tribe of native land has been solicited, abused and bribed in the name of nuclear waste dumping.

Brook 98 Daniel (an American urbanist, historian, journalist and author.) “Environmental Genocide: Native Americans and Toxic Waste” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology Vol. 57, No. 1, January 1998 <https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1-20538772/environmental-genocide-native-americans-and-toxic> DOA: 8.11.16//KAE

Genocide against Native Americans continues in modern times with modern techniques. In the past, buffalo were slaughtered or corn crops were burned, thereby threatening local native populations; now the Earth itself is being strangled, thereby threatening all life. The government and large corporations have created toxic, lethal threats to human health. Yet, because "Native Americans live at the lowest socioeconomic level in the U.S." (Glass, n.d., 3), they are most at risk for toxic exposure. All poor people and people of color are disadvantaged, although "[f]or Indians, these disadvantages are multiplied by dependence on food supplies closely tied to the land and in which [toxic] materials . . . have been shown to accumulate" (ibid.). This essay will discuss the genocide of Native Americans through environmental spoliation and native resistance to it. Although this type of genocide is not (usually) the result of a systematic plan with malicious intent to exterminate Native Americans, it is the consequence of activities that are often carried out on and near the reservations with reckless disregard for the lives of Native Americans.(1) One very significant toxic threat to Native Americans comes from governmental and commercial hazardous waste sitings. Because of the severe poverty and extraordinary vulnerability of Native American tribes, their lands have been targeted by the U.S. government and the large corporations as permanent areas for much of the poisonous industrial by-products of the dominant society. "Hoping to take advantage of the devastating chronic unemployment, pervasive poverty and sovereign status of Indian Nations", according to Bradley Angel, writing for the international environmental organization Greenpeace, "the waste disposal industry and the U.S. government have embarked on an all-out effort to site incinerators, landfills, nuclear waste storage facilities and similar polluting industries on Tribal land" (Angel 1991, 1). In fact, so enthusiastic is the United States government to dump its most dangerous waste from "the nation's 110 commercial nuclear power plants" (ibid., 16) on the nation's "565 federally recognized tribes" (Aug 1993, 9) that it "has solicited every Indian Tribe, offering millions of dollars if the tribe would host a nuclear waste facility" (Angel 1991, 15; emphasis added). Given the fact that Native Americans tend to be so materially poor, the money offered by the government or the corporations for this "toxic trade" is often more akin to bribery or blackmail than to payment for services rendered.(2) In this way, the Mescalero Apache tribe in 1991, for example, became the first tribe (or state) to file an application for a U.S. Energy Department grant "to study the feasibility of building a temporary [sic] storage facility for 15,000 metric tons of highly radioactive spent fuel" (Akwesasne Notes 1992, 11). Other Indian tribes, including the Sac, Fox, Yakima, Choctaw, Lower Brule Sioux, Eastern Shawnee, Ponca, Caddo, and the Skull Valley Band of Goshute, have since applied for the $100,000 exploratory grants as well (Angel 1991, 16-17). Indeed, since so many reservations are without major sources of outside revenue, it is not surprising that some tribes have considered proposals to host toxic waste repositories on their reservations. Native Americans, like all other victimized ethnic **groups, are not passive populations in the face of destruction from imperialism and paternalism. Rather, they are active agents in the making of their own history.** Nearly a century and a half ago, the radical philosopher and political economist Karl Marx realized that people "make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past" (Marx 1978, 595). Therefore, "[t]ribal governments considering or planning waste facilities", asserts Margaret Crow of California Indian Legal Services, "do so for a number of reasons" (Crow 1994, 598). First, lacking exploitable subterranean natural resources, some tribal governments have sought to employ the land itself as a resource in an attempt to fetch a financial return. Second, since many reservations are rural and remote, other lucrative business opportunities are rarely, if ever, available to them. Third, some reservations are sparsely populated and therefore have surplus land for business activities. And fourth, by establishing waste facilities some tribes would be able to resolve their reservations' own waste disposal problems while simultaneously raising much-needed revenue.

#### The uranium mines place on reservation pose several major threats to the native community

Nelkin 81 Dorothy (an American sociologist of science most noted for her work researching and chronicling the unsettled relationship between science and society at large) “Native Americans and Nuclear Power” Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 6, No. 35 (Spring, 1981) http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/689554.pdf?\_=1470887278573DOA: 8.11.16//KAE

Near the village of Paguate, New Mexico, in the Laguna Pueblo lies Anaconda's Jackpile Mine, the first and largest uranium stripmine in the United States. About one-quarter of the working population in the Laguna Pueblo has at some time been employed in the mines. Blasting jolts the village daily and raises clouds of radioactive dust. Laguna councilman, Frank Aragon, complains that this dust settles on the meat that people dry outside their homes. "The uranium gets into our lungs and the food and our people."'9 Water contamination is the major concern in this arid region of the Southwest. Water comes from aquifers-widespread underground reservoirs. Mining uses huge quantities of water, often at a greater rate than it is replenished, so that water tables in mining areas have dramatically declined during the last decade. The drilling rigs of the uranium companies penetrate the sandstone aquifers that provide water for Navajo livestock. Many Navajos believe that the exploration holes that have perforated these aquifers are responsible for the reddening and poisoning of wells and springs. And they fear that radiation pollution of underground water may spread through connected aquifers to a far broader area. An Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) analysis of the Indian water supply found five Navajo community wells with radiochemical contamination exceeding Federal standards. Even the abandoned mines pose hazards as sheep have been lost in the pits and local children sometimes play in them.20 The effect of mining on workers emerged as a major issue when the physical effects of the early mining ventures became apparent. The 1954 Atomic Energy Act provided for AEC regulatory authority only after recovering the ore from its place of deposit-and this was interpreted by the AEC as a mandate to keep hands off the mining operation. It was not until 1967 that radiation standards were applied to occupational safety in the mines. Ex-miners from this period complain of health problems: rashes, respiratory problems, eye problems. They recall that they were not warned of the dangers, did not shower before leaving work, were not given protective goggles, and were ordered back into the mines right after blasting and before the dust settled.

#### Australian aboriginals and indigenous peoples face similar discrimination

Green 16 Radioactive waste and the nuclear war on Australia's Aboriginal people Jim Green 1st July 2016 <http://www.theecologist.org/News/news_analysis/2987853/radioactive_waste_and_the_nuclear_war_on_australias_aboriginal_people.html> Dr James "Jim" Green is the national [anti-nuclear](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-nuclear) campaigner with [Friends of the Earth Australia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friends_of_the_Earth_Australia) and Australian coordinator of the [Beyond Nuclear](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beyond_Nuclear) Initiative.[1] Green is a regular media commentator on nuclear waste issues.[2] He has an honours degree in public health from the [University of Wollongong](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Wollongong) and was awarded a PhD in [science and technology studies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science_and_technology_studies) for his analysis of the [Lucas Heights](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_Flux_Australian_Reactor) research reactor debates.[3]

This isn't the first time that Aboriginal people in South Australia have faced the imposition of a national nuclear waste dump. In 1998, the federal government announced its intention to build a dump near the rocket and missile testing range at Woomera. The proposed dump generated such controversy in South Australia that the federal government hired a public relations company. [Correspondence](http://www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/oz/nontdump/mw) between the company and the government was released under Freedom of Information laws. In one exchange, a government official asked the PR company to remove sand-dunes from a photo to be used in a brochure. The explanation provided by the government official was that: "Dunes are a sensitive area with respect to Aboriginal Heritage". The sand-dunes were removed from the photo, only for the government official to ask if the horizon could be straightened up as well. Aboriginal groups were coerced into signing 'Heritage Clearance Agreements' consenting to test drilling of short-listed sites for the proposed dump. The federal government made it clear that if consent was not granted, drilling would take place anyway. Aboriginal groups were put in an invidious position. They could attempt to protect specific cultural sites by engaging with the federal government and signing agreements, at the risk of having that engagement being misrepresented as consent for the dump; or they could refuse to engage in the process, thereby having no opportunity to protect cultural sites. Aboriginal groups did participate in Heritage Clearance Agreements, and as feared that participation was repeatedly misrepresented by the federal government as amounting to Aboriginal consent for the dump. 'We would not do that for any amount of money' In 2002, the Federal Government tried to buy-off Aboriginal opposition to the dump. Three Native Title claimant groups - the Kokatha, Kuyani and Barngala - were [offered](http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/05/16/1052885400359.html) A$90,000 to surrender their native title rights, but only on the condition that all three groups agreed. The government's offer was refused. Dr Roger Thomas, a Kokatha Traditional Owner, [said](http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/05/16/1052885400359.html): "The insult of it, it was just so insulting. I told the Commonwealth officers to stop being so disrespectful and rude to us by offering us $90,000 to pay out our country and our culture." Andrew Starkey, also a Kokatha man, [said](http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/05/16/1052885400359.html): "It was just shameful. They were wanting people to sign off their cultural heritage rights for a minuscule amount of money. We would not do that for any amount of money." In 2003, the federal government used the Lands Acquisition Act 1989 to seize land for the dump. Native Title rights and interests were extinguished with the stroke of a pen. This took place with no forewarning and no consultation with Aboriginal people.